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7.1.1  Introduction 
This paper provides a framework for understanding the risks to borrowers 
and lenders in international  capital flows. To isolate the features that are intrin- 
sically international, we begin by  analyzing the financial system in a purely 
domestic context. This allows us to focus on the extra effects associated with 
international activity. 
All financial systems are fundamentally affected by two important and per- 
vasive phenomena. First, borrowers and  lenders are plagued by  asymmetric 
information. Borrowers typically have  better information about repayment 
prospects than do lenders, and they try to use this to their advantage. But lend- 
ers are aware of this risk and act accordingly,  limiting their exposure and charg- 
ing a premium for bearing this risk. The second fundamental imperfection is 
that borrowers cannot credibly commit to making repayments that lenders can 
collect at low cost. Since borrowers may choose to renege on their commit- 
ments, lenders bear the risk of not being repaid, but again, since lenders are 
aware of this possibility, enforcement risks end up being shared. Together, these 
For comments, the authors thank Martin Feldstein, conference participants, and an anonymous 
referee. 
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frictions lead to low levels of financial activity, high interest rates, and insuff- 
ciently spread investment risks. 
When we add the international dimension, both problems are exacerbated. 
Information is better inside countries than across international boundaries, and 
it is easier to use the legal system to back up contracts within a country than 
between countries. Consequently we expect to see relatively low amounts of 
international lending and borrowing, substantial premiums for international 
borrowing compared to domestic borrowing, and risks that are poorly spread 
across countries. Our framework makes it unsurprising then that we actually 
observe a low level of  international (relative to domestic) financial activity. 
However, international lending can still be expected to occur between coun- 
tries with dramatically different levels of wealth or different sources of  sys- 
temic risk, or if  competition from foreign capital improves the efficiency of 
the domestic financial system. 
The differences between domestic and international financial systems are 
not merely microeconomic issues of  information and enforcement. Interna- 
tional capital flows are associated with two additional macroeconomic risks 
that are essentially absent in the domestic context. The first is sovereign risk; 
governments can choose to default on their international obligations. The sec- 
ond is the risk that international capital flows create macroeconomic instability 
through monetary spillovers. When capital flows internationally, the effects on 
the balance of  payments spill out to the macroeconomy through the money 
supply and exchange rate, frequently with adverse effects. 
In section 7.1.2 of the paper, we begin our analysis with a description of the 
financial system in a purely domestic setting. After identifying the fundamental 
sources of risk in this context, we move on in section 7.1.3 to an international 
setting. Section 7.1.4 provides an analysis of the macroeconomic effects of in- 
ternational lending that are absent in a purely domestic setting. The paper ends 
with a few brief conclusions. 
7.1.2  The Domestic Financial System 
We  begin our analysis by  considering the financial system at a relatively 
abstract level in a purely domestic context. This enables us to isolate the funda- 
mental problems, which constitute extra risks to lenders and borrowers, that 
can, in principle, be avoided with a perfect financial system. In the next two 
sections, we consider what extra issues emerge in an international context.’ 
It is easiest to isolate the issues of interest with a thought experiment. Imag- 
ine an economy with a large number of farmers. The farmers are interested in 
borrowing seed (capital) to plant (invest) in their fields. A large number of 
individuals saving for the future are potentially interested in lending funds to 
the farmers, especially if the returns exceed the “safe” (risk-free) rate of return. 
1. This section borrows from Eichengreen and Rose (1997) and Gertler and Rose (1994). 365  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
Consider, first, an idealized setting in which (1) all markets are competitive; 
(2) information is costless; and (3) borrowers and lenders can write credible 
contracts, guaranteed to be honored by both sides by  a costless legal system, 
that cover all possible contingencies. The role of a financial system is to mobi- 
lize the savings of potential lenders and allocate these funds efficiently across 
the investment projects of potential borrowers. In our idealized economy, how 
well does the system work? 
Flawlessly. In the frictionless setting, savers lend to farmers freely at the 
risk-free rate.2  Market forces allocate the income of individuals efficiently be- 
tween consumption and savings and then allocate savings across different farm- 
ers’ investment projects. Each farmer borrows seed, signing a contract that speci- 
fies repayment plus interest to the lender under all possible circumstances. 
Since lenders compete to lend funds to borrowers, loan rates are driven down 
to the risk-free interest rate (arbitrage eliminates higher rates and no lender 
accepts less than the risk-free rate). Lenders do not have to worry about how 
much effort the farmer puts into tending crops-their  repayment does not de- 
pend on the farmer’s  action^.^ All farmers are able to borrow up to the point 
that the additional discounted expected return from capital just equals its price 
(the interest rate). There are no liquidity problems, and there is no need for 
precautionary savings. Government policy is unnecessary and would in general 
be counterprod~ctive.~ 
This idyllic example is illustrated with dotted lines in figure 7.1. Perfect 
competition ensures that the supply of funds (measured on the x-axis) is fiat at 
the risk-free rate, denoted r (interest rates are measured on the y-axi~).~  The de- 
mand for loans is downward sloping.6  The point at which the two lines intersect 
gives the equilibrium quantity lent, x. 
2. Given costless information, the farmers face an efficient market for insurance against the 
financial hazards incurred in farming (weather, price volatility, etc.). Hence, there is no reason for 
insurance to be bundled with financing. Since the farmers can obtain insurance and there is com- 
plete freedom of contracting, default risk is irrelevant in this idyllic setting. When, however, infor- 
mation is costly, economies of scale in information gathering can make the bundling of financing 
and insurance desirable vis-8-vis their separate provision. Consequently, we can expect to see 
lenders take on some insurance role through their willingness to face default risk. We develop this 
point in greater detail below. 
3. The farmer’s insurer will care about the farmer’s efforts. Since, however, we are assuming 
costless information and freedom of contract, this will not pose a problem; i.e.,  there can be no 
moral hazard problem. Hence, any trade-off between insurance and incentives can be avoided. 
4.  If the rest of the world were also described by these assumptions, there would be no relation 
between domestic savings and investment; the identity and national origin of savers and borrowers 
would be irrelevant. 
5.  There is an implicit assumption that the market for farm capital is sufficiently small relative 
to the overall economy that the movement of funds to the farm sector does not cause the price of 
capital in other markets (i.e., the risk-free rate) to rise. Le., we are assuming that general equilib- 
rium effects are small. 
6.  This is a standard property of all factor demands. 366  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
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Imperfect Information and Enforcement 
Unfortunately, the idyllic situation portrayed in figure 7.1 is far from reality. 
Each of  the assumptions we  made is grossly unrealistic as a description of 
even advanced countries. There are barriers to entry in the financial system, 
information is unevenly distributed, and there are problems in enforcing con- 
tracts. Unsurprisingly,  the predictions of the model are also not borne out in re- 
ality. 
Our frictionless example is a poor description of reality for two fundamental 
reasons: imperfect information and difficulties associated with writing and en- 
forcing contracts.’ Information is costly to obtain, and the law imposes restric- 
tions on the set of loan contracts that can be written (e.g., a debtor cannot waive 
his right to file for bankruptcy). Moreover, even within the set of legally en- 
forceable contracts, the costs of using the legal system are high and uncertain. 
The most critical legal limitations on loan contracts are those that limit the 
amount that can be seized from the borrower should the borrower default on 
the loan. Of these, the most important is the right to declare bankruptcy, which 
limits the debtor’s liability. In the case of individual borrowers, personal bank- 
ruptcy laws, elimination of  debtors’ prisons, and prohibitions on slavery com- 
bine to make it almost completely impossible to seize the typical individual’s 
most valuable asset, his human capital. In many states, his second and third 
most valuable assets-his  house and car-also  enjoy some protection against 
seizure.8 
Limited liabilities laws and their ilk would not, per se, be directly relevant 
to lending in a world of full (symmetric)  information. The borrower could take 
care of default risk by  purchasing insurance from a third party, much in the 
7. We think of imperfect competition in the financial system as being less important; it usually 
8. See, e.g., Aghion and Hermalin (1990) for an economic analysis of  such laws. 
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way some mortgage covenants require the borrower to obtain mortgage insur- 
ance and homeowner’s insurance. In the real world, however, information is 
typically asymmetric, with the borrower having better information about his 
prospects than a lender or insurer. Here, default risk becomes directly relevant 
to lending. As is well known (see, e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976), when 
the insured have better information than the insurers-a  situation known as ad- 
verse selection-insurance  markets do not work efficiently. In particular, risks 
will not be  fully insured. Consequently, a lender will ultimately face some 
default risk. This has a number of consequences for lending. 
First, because the lender is exposed to default risk, the lender will have to 
charge a higher interest rate as a means of being compensated for bearing this 
risk. Hence, the interest rate will be higher than it would be absent default risk. 
Second, because the lender will want to know  the extent of  this risk, the 
lender will be forced to acquire information about the borrower. Since informa- 
tion acquisition is costly, it is inefficient for two parties, the lender and an 
insurer, to both collect this information. Consequently, efficiency dictates that 
the supplying-of-funds function and the insurance function be bundled to- 
gether by a single entity. That is, the interest rate is the sum of two prices: the 
cost of funds plus an “insurance premium” that the borrower pays the lender for 
the latter to assume the default risk. Moreover, because of asymmetric informa- 
tion, the borrower’s total cost of borrowing (the interest rate plus the premium) 
will be greater than it would have been given symmetric information. Hence, 
the volume of lending will be less relative to a symmetric information world. 
Third, lenders will tend to be “large.” Given that each loan is now risky, an 
individual would be reluctant to enter into a one-to-one lending arrangement; 
the individual would not want to absorb that risk. If, however, that individual 
pools his capital with the capital of others and this “syndicate” makes a variety 
of loans, they can diversify away much of the risk.9 The need for financial in- 
termediaries to be large, combined with government regulation of entry into 
this industry, will yield these financial intermediaries a certain degree of mar- 
ket power. Consequently, we can expect these financial intermediaries  to price 
their loans above their cost, which will further reduce the volume of lending 
relative to a symmetric information world. 
Fourth, asymmetric information can lead to both the misallocation of funds 
and an increase in interest rates due to a “lemons” problem (see Akerlof 1970). 
This problem is most readily illustrated by an example: Suppose that there are 
two types of farmers, high risk and low risk, who are equally represented in 
the population of farmers. A high-risk farmer will, with equal probability, pro- 
duce either $13 worth of output or $0 worth of output. A low-risk farmer will 
produce $7 worth of  output with certainty. Observe that the low-risk farmer 
9. Since there are also significant economies of scale in raising capital, providing banking ser- 
vices (e.g.,  anATh4 network), etc., diversification is not the only motive for large financial interme- 
diaries to arise, but it is, nevertheless, a significant one. 368  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
has the higher expected return. Both types of  farmer have negligible capital 
and must borrow $6 for seed. Although a farmer knows what type he is, a 
lender does not. Assume that the farmers are protected by  limited liability- 
should they default on a loan the lender gets only the value of the output. Fi- 
nally, assume the risk-free interest rate is 10 percent, so lenders will only make 
loans that have an expected value of at least $6.60. In this situation, the lender 
will require a payment of at least $8.80 to make a loan of $6; otherwise, be- 
cause of default risk, the lender will certainly lose money on average.’O But 
since the low-risk farmer only earns $7, he will certainly default; he would do 
better to exit farming and employ his negligible capital elsewhere-this  de- 
spite the fact that were this a symmetric information world, he would want and 
could receive a loan of $6. Recognizing that the low-risk farmer will exit the 
market, the lender will demand to be repaid at least $13.20 to make a loan of 
$6 (since it knows it will be lending to high-risk farmers only, who have a 50 
percent default rate). But then the high-risk farmer will also certainly default, 
and he too would exit farming. Viewed another way, the farm sector is starved 
of capital and hence ceases to function. Observe that although the high-risk 
farmer would be excluded from borrowing under symmetric information (his 
expected return of $6.50 means a lender could not earn a 10 percent return), 
the low-risk farmer would not. Hence, we see that asymmetric information will 
lead to higher interest rates and the misallocation of capital.” 
Fifth, because the lender absorbs some of the risk-essentially  provides par- 
tial insurance to the borrower-the  borrower’s incentives can be dampened. 
Because what the borrower receives in good (nondefault) outcomes is only a 
portion of his project’s return, his incentive to work for good outcomes is re- 
duced. A related problem is that because the borrower is not gambling with 
his own money, his incentive under worsening financial conditions could be 
to “double up” on his bets-attempt  to borrow more or pursue riskier, asset- 
dissipating behavior-in  a desperate attempt to generate cash. That is, because 
it’s not his money on the margin, the desperate borrower feels no compunction 
against throwing good money after bad. Asymmetric information-the  high 
cost of  monitoring the borrower-makes  it difficult for the lender to guard 
against such moral hazard problems. 
Although the discussion so far paints a somewhat dire picture, it needs to be 
remembered that both lenders and borrowers can take measures to mitigate 
10. Let B he the amount to he repaid (the face value of the debt). Suppose the lender could 
expect to receive B 100 percent of the time from low-risk farmers (who make up half the popula- 
tion). Clearly, however, it can only expect repayment 50 percent of the time from high-risk farmers 
(who make up the other half of the population). Hence, its probability of repayment would be only 
75 percent; so it would need to ask for a 33 percent premium to be insured against default risk 
(i.e., .75 X B 2  6.60 only if B 2 8.80). 
11. If we changed the high-risk farmer’s good outcome from $13 to $13.50, then the low-risk 
farmer, who would still have the higher expected return, would still he blocked from borrowing, 
but the high-risk farmer would now be able to borrow (at an effective interest rate of 120  percent). 
Here, then, capital would be diverted from a high-return use to a lower return use. 369  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
Table 7.1  FDIC-Insured Lenders’ Debt Collateralized by Real Estate 
Year  Percentage 
1995  21 
1994  21 
1993  22 
1992  22 
1991  21 
1990  20 
1989  19 
1988  18 
1987  11 
1986  15 
1985  13 
1984  13 
Note: The apparent trend toward increased collateralization with real estate may be misleading. 
Following the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, FSLIC, the deposit insurer of S&Ls, 
was eliminated and FDIC  took over insuring S&L deposits. Since S&Ls do a higher proportion of 
their lending on real estate than banks, the apparent trend could be due to this change in the 
population mix, rather than to any trend in lending. 
some of  the problems caused by  asymmetric information. Lenders can, for 
instance, monitor borrowers and employ methods of screening poor credit risks 
from good credit risks. They can also demand collateral (in fact, roughly 20 
percent of lending by FDIC-insured institutions is collateralized with real es- 
tate-see  table 7.1-suggesting  the importance of  limiting default risk in 
lending). Since lenders presumably undertake these measures to reduce the 
costs to which they would otherwise be exposed from asymmetric information, 
these measures should serve to lower the cost of lending relative to a situation 
of “pure” asymmetric information. We note, for later, that these methods often 
benefit from (and may even require) proximity between lender and borrower. 
Borrowers too can attempt to mitigate problems of  asymmetric information 
by  taking actions that signal information about themselves (such as offering 
collateral). Unlike lender screening and monitoring, however, signaling does 
not necessarily lower borrowing costs. The reason is that there is something of 
a “rat race” component to signaling; for a signal to convince a lender of the 
borrower’s creditworthiness, it may have to be “extreme.” Consequently, total 
borrowing costs (interest plus cost of signaling) can be greater than in a world 
in which borrowers are prohibited from signaling.I2  This further increase in 
borrowing costs will, of  course, lead to even less borrowing and an even 
smaller capital market. 
The information and enforcement frictions between lenders and borrowers 
lead to two general conclusions. First, borrowers will pay a premium for “ex- 
ternal finance,” that is, noncollateralized borrowing. This premium compen- 
12. See Aghion and Hermalin (1990) for details and examples. 370  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
sates lenders for default risk, with the size of the premium being affected by 
the observable risk, the unobservable risk due to moral hazard, and the lemons 
problem (offset, somewhat, by the lender’s efforts to screen for creditworthi- 
ness and monitor existing loans). Second, as a consequence, investors are able 
to borrow less than they would with perfect (symmetric information) financial 
markets. The scale of financial activity is smaller than it would be in the ab- 
sence of these problems. 
To make this more concrete, let us return to the farming example. Even with 
a perfect financial system, the harvest will be a result of  many factors, some 
controlled by  the farmer (e.g., the amount of effort spent tending the crops), 
some the result of the financial system (the amount of seed planted), and others 
more random still (weather). If  it were costless to monitor the actions of farm- 
ers and to collect the payments specified in an all-encompassing and costlessly 
enforced contract, a saver could lend funds directly to farmers without any 
financial intermediary. In return, savers would receive a fixed return. But in 
reality, the farmer has better information than potential investors about soil 
quality, pest problems, and so forth. Furthermore, it is impossible to specify 
the amount of effort the farmer should apply in all circumstances; and even if 
it were, it would be impossible to monitor how much effort is actually applied. 
Court costs are far from negligible, and the farmer will also have the right to 
declare bankruptcy and walk away from his debt in sufficiently bad circum- 
stances. Financial intermediaries, which can exploit economies of  scale to re- 
duce information and enforcement costs and can diversify risk, will come into 
existence-with  possibly some reduction in lending competition-and  all fi- 
nancial activity will be channeled through them; the cost advantage of interme- 
diaries will eliminate direct loans from savers to borrowers. Intermediaries will 
only advance funds to a farmer at a loan rate higher than the risk-free interest 
rate. The farmer will accordingly borrow less than he would have chosen at a 
lower loan rate. 
As a result, the investment decisions made by the farmer will depend on the 
farmer’s financial situation. The farmer will first use internal funds to buy seed 
and  only rely  on external finance (e.g., bank  loans) where necessary. The 
farmer will not maximize the value of the farm; crops will not be planted to 
the point where the risk-adjusted cost of funds equals the marginal expected 
gain from planting seed. Investors and farmers, consequently, lose out on prof- 
itable investment opportunities not undertaken, and the farmers further lose in 
that they bear too much idiosyncratic risk. 
The  effects  of  asymmetric information  and  enforcement problems  are 
readily observed in figure 7.2. Both the demand for seed capital and the supply 
of  savings are affected; the more realistic schedules are portrayed with solid 
lines (otherwise the figure is identical to fig. 7.1).  The supply of funds is unaf- 
fected at low levels of lending activity. Up to the point of the farmers’ collat- 
eralizable net worth, farmers can simply self-finance investment projects or 371  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
Loan Rate 
Lending, Borrowing 
Fig. 7.2  Financial system with imperfect information and 
enforcement problems 
provide collateral for any net borrowing.L3  But after this point, finance from 
other lenders-“uncollateralized  external finance”-is  required. Assuming a 
decreasing-returns-to-scale  screening and monitoring technology, the supply 
curve then rises, reflecting the rising marginal cost of originating loans. The 
demand curve shifts in as well, since signaling behavior and the removal of full 
insurance raise the farmers’ cost of borrowing. 
Policy 
Policy toward the financial sector matters because it can make business more 
or less costly for financial intermediaries. The more costly lending is, the 
greater the premium intermediaries will demand and, as the price of  funds 
increases, the less borrowing there will be. 
Policy can also protect-or  harm-the  precarious balancing act financial 
intermediaries must perform: The fact that their assets (deposits)  are less liquid 
than their liabilities renders their financial condition delicate, and confidence 
is thus essential to their stability. If confidence wanes for any reason, the fact 
that demand for funds is met on a first-come, first-served basis gives creditors 
an incentive to liquidate their deposits at the first sign of trouble. Such a run 
means a contraction of lending activity. 
For these reasons, governments wish to avoid disruptions in the financial 
sector. A number of standard policies can be taken to strengthen the financial 
sector. These include (1) deposit insurance for banks, (2) reserve requirements, 
(3) capital requirements, (4) restrictions on the riskiness of assets held by  fi- 
nancial firms, (5) direct supervision, and (6) provision of lender-of-last-resort 
facilities. These policies can help to ensure the stability of the financial sector, 
13. However, self-financing  means that farmers may bear too much idiosyncratic risk. 372  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
thereby reducing the underlying enforcement and information problems. By 
reducing risks they can encourage more efficient, inexpensive, and widespread 
financial activity.I4 
7.1.3  How Does International Lending Exacerbate 
Information and Enforcement Problems? 
Both of  the fundamental problems we encountered in the financial system 
are exacerbated when we consider international lending. Local intermediaries 
are likely to have better information about local investment opportunities and 
risks than foreign intermediaries; they are also more likely to know how to 
squeeze payments from local  borrower^.'^ In contrast, foreign intermediaries 
suffer from less information; hence, the problems of asymmetric information 
discussed above will be worse than for domestic lending. 
The history of financial intermediation in the United States offers some evi- 
dence that domestic lenders have advantages over foreign lenders. Although 
partly due to restrictions on interstate banking and state restrictions on branch 
banking, most credit organizations in the United States have tended to be local 
operations despite the obvious risk reduction advantages to geographic diversi- 
fication. This was undoubtedly due to the high cost of obtaining information 
about geographically distant borrowers.I6 Indeed, even social distance proved 
sufficient to restrict many savings and loan societies to operating within a sin- 
gle local immigrant group. More recently, evidence from the operation of sav- 
ings and loans in the 1980s finds that those that made “long-distance” loans 
were outperformed by those that did not.” 
A related problem is that foreign intermediaries often must compete against 
domestic intermediaries. As we have just noted, domestic intermediaries will 
have an information advantage vis-8-vis their foreign competitors. There are 
two consequences of  this advantage. First, domestic intermediaries will, for 
reasons discussed previously, enjoy a cost advantage over foreign intermediar- 
14. Of  course, such policies can have inadvertent and perverse consequences. E.g., providing 
deposit insurance reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor intermediaries’ activities. In ad- 
dition, deposit insurance-coupled  with limited liability-turns  intermediaries into giant “put 
options” for shareholders: the shareholders receive the upside gain but can “put” the intermediary 
to the deposit insurer in bad states. This can lead intermediaries to behave in a risk-seeking manner 
with corresponding inefficiencies and misallocations of resources (for empirical estimates of this 
effect in the context of  U.S. savings and loans, see Hermalin and Wallace 1994, 1997). 
15. This point is often made in the development literature, where it is argued that a good way 
to deliver credit to rural farmers is to use village elders and chieftains as agents because of their 
superior knowledge of creditworthiness and their greater ability to force repayment (e.g.,  by threat- 
ening social sanctions). See Fuentes (1996) for more on this point, as well as references to empiri- 
cal confirmation. 
16. This could also reflect within-firm information problems exacerbated by geographic distance 
(e.g., it could be harder to control a local agent of the firm the farther he is from headquarters). 
17. See Hermalin and Wallace (1994) for evidence on this matter. 373  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
ies. This allows them to be tougher competitors, which squeezes the foreign 
intermediaries’ profits. Indeed, the cost advantage could be sufficient that for- 
eign intermediaries are unable to capture enough of  the market to cover the 
fixed costs of  entry, so they are kept out of the domestic credit market alto- 
gether. The second consequence is that because a domestic intermediary is 
able to offer better rates than a foreign competitor, foreign competitors will be 
second-choice lenders for domestic borrowers. That is, foreign intermediaries 
could face an adverse selection of borrowers who have been denied credit by 
the better informed domestic intermediaries. This adverse selection means that 
foreign lenders are exposed to even greater risk. 
There is some empirical evidence to support these conjectures. When U.S. 
savings and loans were allowed by  deregulation to pursue lines of  business 
previously restricted to commercial banks, those that took advantage of these 
new powers were greatly outperformed by those that chose to stay with tradi- 
tional lines of business.18  A plausible interpretation of this result is that those 
savings and loans that strayed from traditional lines had an information disad- 
vantage vis-A-vis commercial banks. Consequently, they made lower profits 
and suffered higher rates of loan defaults.I9 
Given these information disadvantages faced by  foreign lenders, the ob- 
served low levels of international financial activity seem unsurprising. This is 
especially true when we add the impact of enforcement problems. 
Enforcement can be harder across international borders than within national 
boundaries. First, an alien legal system means that a foreign lender’s domestic 
expertise on enforcement is of lower value; the foreign lender may, therefore, 
need to make expensive investments in acquiring the necessary expertise or 
become reliant on expensive local expertise. Second, in countries where the 
rule of law does not always function well, such as some developing countries 
or some postcommunist states, enforcement can be hampered by the borrow- 
er’s ability to employ extralegal methods to deter enforcement (harass auditors, 
spirit assets away, etc.). Third, the legal system could exhibit a nationalistic 
bias, making enforcement by a foreign lender more difficult than it would be 
for a domestic lender.20  These problems add either directly to the foreign lend- 
er’s cost of lending or, by increasing the foreigner’s risk, indirectly to the cost 
of  lending. Higher costs, in turn, mean the foreign supply of funds shifts in, 
raising the interest rate and lowering the total amount of  lending. 
A further problem with international lending is thal international banking 
policy is less well developed than domestic banking policy. Many of the policy 
18. This result controls for pre-deregulation  performance, so this is not the case of incompetent 
19. See Hermalin and Wallace (1994) for a complete discussion. 
20. This is a problem within the United States in lender liability suits where juries often favor 
thrifts, unable to compete in their traditional lines, going looking for greener pastures. 
local debtors (the plaintiffs) against distant banks (the defendants). See Fischel(l989). 374  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
institutions that serve to reduce the risks in the domestic financial sector do not 
exist at the international  Deposit insurance, for instance, is essentially 
absent internationally.22  Lender-of-last-resort facilities are a very  uncertain 
business at the international 
On the other hand, financial intermediaries can benefit from a lack of regula- 
tion.  Government-imposed reserve requirements and  bank  supervision are 
largely absent at the international level, and requirements on capital adequacy 
and asset riskiness are much more difficult to monitor. This gives intermedi- 
aries greater flexibility, which, in theory, should allow them to make greater 
profits. The U.S. experience with savings and loan deregulation,  however, sug- 
gests that greater flexibility may not be associated with greater profits in prac- 
tice. The reasons for this are relevant to international lending. Intermediaries 
may respond to greater flexibility by rationally pursuing riskier strategies; but 
then the rate of failure can be expected to go up. Because intermediaries are 
themselves debtors (their deposits, recall, are loans from depositors) protected 
by limited liability, they receive upside gains but can walk away from downside 
losses. This, in turn, can give them risk-seeking preferences; that is, they could 
prefer a lower expected return, but riskier venture to a higher expected return, 
but safer venture.24  Consequently, average retums could be lower than they 
would have been under tighter regulation. 
In addition, the perception that international financial activity is risky may 
become a self-fulfilling prediction if  governments create barriers to interna- 
tional capital flows. Historically, many governments have viewed international 
borrowing and lending as a source of more risk than opportunity and have ac- 
cordingly erected international capital flow barriers. 
The effects of international  lending can be portrayed using the same concep- 
tual apparatus as we applied in section 7.1.2.  To clarify things, figure 7.3 illus- 
trates the effects of allowing either only domestic or foreign lending to finance 
investment projects. Both information and enforcement problems are exacer- 
bated by international lending; the relevant demand and supply schedules are 
graphed with dashed lines. The supply curve is higher and to the left of the 
domestic case, since the collateralizable net worth of  the borrower is lower to 
foreign lenders than it is to domestic lenders (because of additional enforce- 
21. The absence of these institutions is part of the raison d’gtre for the offshore financial sector. 
“Eurobanks” began to flourish in part because of the cost advantages that stemmed from the lack 
of  regulation and reserve requirements. 
22. This may also restrict foreign lenders to lending domestically raised funds. Since the source 
of funds is not as well diversified as it would be were the lender able to attract nondomestic funds, 
the lender is exposed to greater risks-such  as duration mismatches-which  raises its cost of 
business (although this cost is incurred regardless of where it lends). 
23. While the Basle Committee has improved the supervision of  multinational hanks (most 
famously of late through bank capital measures), there are still many ambiguities, especially in 
the lender-of-last-resort facilities. 
24. Hermalin and Wallace (1994) found evidence that deregulation resulted in many thrifts’ 
switching to riskier, but lower expected return lines of  business from their traditional lines of 




Fig. 7.3  Financial system with only foreign lending 
ment  and information problems). If  borrowers are further restricted in the 
amount of insurance they are allowed to purchase, they may react to this in- 
creased risk bearing by reducing their demand for funds, shifting the demand 
curve in. 
The differences between international and domestic financial activity are 
simply a matter of the degree to which information and enforcement problems 
bite. They need not be large; indeed, they need not exist at all. In principle, 
both enforcement and information problems could be less serious for interna- 
tional lending.25  Still, the fact that international capital flows have historically 
been small-see  tables 7.2 and 7.3 for evidence, and chapters 1.1 by Edwards, 
3.1 by Ito, and especially 5.1 by Tesar in this volume-is  consistent with our ar- 
guments that enforcement and information issues are worse for international 
lenders.26 
International lending is more difficult than purely domestic lending; but in- 
ternational capital flows do exist and are in fact growing more rapidly than 
purely domestic activity. Why? The situation portrayed in figure 7.3 is too pes- 
simistic since it ignores two important factors. First, it compares two different 
supply curves-one  with only domestic savings, the other with only foreign 
savings. In reality, countries that allow international capital flows can finance 
investment projects with either or both. In this case, the aggregate supply- 
of-savings curve is unambiguously flatter than  the purely  domestic curve. 
25. It is easy to think of counterexamples.  Foreign expertise about export sectors can easily be 
superior to domestic information. Investors in recently deregulated or emerging sectors may bene- 
fit from foreign experience,  providing an information advantage to foreigners.  And foreigners  may 
find governments and judicial systems more sympathetic to their claims than to those of domes- 
tic residents. 
26. Table 7.2  contains data on the outstanding stocks and new issues of domestic debt in the 
OECD countries;  table 7.3 contains the analogous data on international  debt. While there are tech- 
nical problems involved in a direct comparison,  there seems to be little doubt that the overwhelm- 
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Table 7.2  Stocks and Net Issues of Domestic Debt (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Country  1993  1994  1995 
Total OECDa  19,714.5  22,171.4  24,110.0 
United States  9,340.2  9,963.1  10,726 
Japan  3,976.7  4,750  4,958.6 
Canada  469.6  463.6  503.3 
Net issues  1,604.4  1,474.4  1,680.3 
United Kingdom  440.8  524.6  598.7 
Source: Ito and Folkerts-Landau (1996.59). 
=Excluding  Iceland and Turkey. 
Table 7.3  Stocks and Net Issues of International Debt (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Stocks 
Net Issues, 
Country  1993  1994  1995  1995 
All countries  2,037.8  2,441.7  2,803.3  313.2 
Industrial  1,650.3  1,976.4  2,277.8  261.8 
United States  176.9  209.3  272.8  m.6 
Developing  121.8  162.1  192.9  31.3 
Japan  340.1  360.6  356.7  7.3 
Source: It0 and Folkerts-Landau (1996,57). 
Allowing capital flows can only reduce capital market imperfections,  lowering 
interest rates and raising lending activity. 
Second, the situation portrayed in figure 7.3 implicitly compares two identi- 
cal countries. But countries differ in many ways; some-developing  countries 
in particular-are  capital poor. A small developing country with a relatively 
low endowment of capital faces a steeper supply-of-domestic-funds curve than 
it does if foreign capital is allowed to flow in. Since Northern countries are 
well capitalized, they will tend to have fewer investment opportunities with 
high rates of return, as most such opportunities are exploited as they emerge. 
Hence, the North will be willing to lend funds at a rate of return lower than 
required by  Southern residents. Foreigners need not even be better endowed 
with capital if their presence creates more competitive domestic capital mar- 
kets. And the systemic risks that affect countries can be different, providing a 
potentially important argument for international diversification. As  a result, 
interest rates can fall and loan activity rise with international  capital flows. 
Figure 7.4 provides an illustration of this case for a capital-poor country or 
a country with an uncompetitive domestic financial sector. As in figure 7.3, to 
clarify the argument we compare financing all investment projects with either 
domestic or foreign savings. Because of  information and enforcement prob- 




Fig. 7.4  Foreign lending for a capital-poor country 
foreign supply curve starts to rise at a lower level. On the other hand, since 
foreigners have a larger (or more competitive) financial system because of their 
abundance of capital, the foreign supply curve is flatter than the purely domes- 
tic supply curve.27  The net result is ambiguous. Interest rates may be lower and 
total financial activity higher with only foreign finance, as depicted. If  the 
country is relatively well endowed with capital, or the domestic financial sys- 
tem is relatively efficient, then the more pessimistic situation of  figure 7.3 
will prevail. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that foreign capital systems are more effi- 
cient than domestic financial structures in many countries. Offshore capital 
markets are large and very competitive, as can be seen in tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
International financial activity is large compared to domestic financial sectors 
for all except the largest industrial countries. 
Finally, we should not forget that because foreign lending offers intermedi- 
aries geographic diversification of  their loan portfolios, an intermediary in 
country A could value a loan in country B more than a country B intermediary. 
The growth of  international capital flows is, arguably, a manifestation of 
policies that have systematically reduced information and enforcement prob- 
lems. For instance, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) rules can be 
viewed as an attempt to reduce information problems on the strength of banks 
viewed from an international perspective. The accession of  countries to the 
international economic community-say  by membership in the International 
Monetary Fund  (IMF), the World  Trade Organization, and  regional trade 
agreements-can  be viewed as devices to lower enforcement costs. In addi- 
tion, policies that allow for foreign control of  domestic intermediaries mean 
that capital-rich foreign intermediaries can more easily team up with expertise- 
27. Foreign capital may also be supplied more elastically than domestic capital if systemic risks 
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rich domestic intermediaries, and this control means they can reduce their 
risksSz8  Finally, although not  solely the result of  government policy,  high- 
speed computers, a globally improved telecommunications infrastructure, and 
greater competition in transportation have reduced the costs of  long-distance 
monitoring and screening of loans. 
In summary, two fundamental problems are responsible for imperfect finan- 
cial systems: imperfect information and the difficulty of  writing credible and 
enforceable contracts. Foreigners are likely to have worse information about 
domestic investment projects; they are also likely to find it more difficult to 
write enforceable contracts at low cost. Since foreign intermediaries are usu- 
ally at a disadvantage compared to domestic intermediaries, we would be sur- 
prised to see large amounts of international financial activity. There are, how- 
ever, three caveats: large differences in capital abundance, a desire for systemic 
risk diversification, and an inefficient domestic financial structure can all in- 
duce large capital flows. 
7.1.4  Macroeconomic Aspects of International Lending 
We have discussed the financial imperfections at the heart of financial sys- 
tems from a purely microeconomic viewpoint thus far. But an internationally 
integrated financial system also differs from an autarkic domestic system in 
two important macroeconomic aspects. First, borrowing countries can choose 
to default on foreign debt. The possibility of  sovereign risk must be taken 
into account by  potential lenders. Second, the domestic monetary regime is 
strongly affected by the presence of capital flows. This also has important im- 
plications for the monetary system of  a recipient country, adding monetary 
instability to the potential risks borne by borrowers. 
Sovereign Risk 
In any society, firms and individuals occasionally find themselves unable or 
unwilling to meet their financial obligations, often for reasons beyond their 
control. A declaration of bankruptcy typically then gives creditors the right to 
seize the assets of the debtor. Sovereign risk differs from ordinary bankruptcy 
risk because enforcing this right beyond the jurisdiction of the creditor’s gov- 
ernment requires the cooperation of another government (Eaton 1990). If  the 
defaulting agent is itself a government, it is unlikely to hand over domestic as- 
sets to foreign creditors, and those creditors will have little or no legal recourse. 
Sovereign risk constitutes an important impediment to international financial 
activity.z9 
28. In particular, the foreigners  can  reduce  the  “agency” problems-insufficient  screening 
and monitoring by  the domestic intermediary, misallocation of  funds, etc.-that  could arise in 
an arm’s-length relationship. It is, however, reasonable to expect that even within-intermediary 
agency problems could be exacerbated by geographic distance (consider, e.g., Nick Leeson and 
Barings Bank). For more on agency issues, see Williamson (1985). 
29. In a theoretical sense, sovereign risk can be viewed as an enforcement problem. 379  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
Table 7.4  Countries in External Payments Arrears, End of 1995 
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Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (Washington, 
D.C., 1996). 
Table 7.4 contains a list of countries in official payments arrears at the end 
of  1995, as tabulated in the IMF’s  1996  Annual Report on  Exchange Arrange- 
ments and Exchange Restrictions.  30 Long as this list is, it still understates the 
importance of  sovereign risk. First, the very threat of  sovereign risk has re- 
duced international lending. Second, the list does not account for the effects 
of external rescue packages of the sort that prevented defaults by, for instance, 
Mexico and Argentina in  1994-95  and Thailand and Korea in  1997. Third, 
arrears have been much higher in the recent past, as any bank exposed to Latin 
debt in 1980s is painfully aware. 
The possibility of  sovereign default is clearly an important risk borne by 
international borrowers and lenders. Still, it must be of limited importance in 
practice; if it were not, debtor countries would never pay back foreign credi- 
tors. Since repayment is the norm, there must be important reasons for govern- 
ments not to default. What are they? 
One way to limit sovereign default risk is for creditors to threaten to seize 
the overseas assets of debtor countries. This incentive is of obviously limited 
importance if the borrower is a net debtor.31 
A more important reason why debtor countries continue to pay their interna- 
tional obligations is that creditor countries can refuse to engage in trade with 
30. External payments arrears include arrears that have been caused by exchange restrictions on 
current payments or transfers,  as well as overdue arrears on financial obligations of which the 
obligor is the government or a resident in the country in question. 
31. A “common pool” problem could also exist: if there is more than one creditor, a given 
creditor can be frozen out if other creditors attach the overseas assets first. Although this does not 
affect the deterrent effect of seizure for the debtor nation, it does increase the risk for its creditors. 380  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
debtors. Trade credit can be cut off, boycotts begun, and goods can be seized, 
thereby reducing the welfare of debtor countries.32  Such sanctions can be im- 
portant, especially for small countries with large gains from trade. Still, these 
sanctions are also limited in scope, since creditor countries also lose from dis- 
ruptions in international trade. Creditor countries may lack the will to impose 
sanctions, particularly when the trade sectors have more political clout than 
the financial sector. Furthermore, to be most effective, the creditor countries 
must put up a common front; however, the temptation to cheat on such a boy- 
cott could be large (particularly when the exports of the creditor countries are 
in competition), making united action difficult. Finally, the trading partners 
could not all be creditor countries, which would mitigate the disruption (e.g., 
the defaulting nation could find substitute providers of critical imports and it 
could use these other trading partners to transship goods). 
Another potential way to limit sovereign risk is for lending countries to di- 
versify their risks by spreading loans across debtor countries. Complete diver- 
sification, however, requires negative correlation across default risks (eg,  as 
default risk in Mexico increases, default risk falls in Brazil). Yet, as shown by 
the Latin American experience of the 1980s, positive correlation would seem 
more likely than negative correlation. 
An often-cited limit to sovereign risk is the “reputation effect.” A country 
that anticipates needing foreign capital in the future will find it easier to borrow 
if it earns a reputation as a good credit risk by  continued repayment.33  After 
all, defaulting countries can be cut off from future borrowing by  creditors or 
charged higher rates of interest than they would otherwise face. The empiri- 
cal importance of this seems dubious, however. Many countries have defaulted 
on their international obligations only to reenter international credit markets 
shortly thereafter; the most dramatic recent examples are the Latin countries 
since the debt crisis of  1982.34 
Yet, reentry into the credit markets does not necessarily disprove the logic 
of  the reputation effect. While it is true that early game-theoretic models of 
the reputation effect assumed infinite punishment of transgressors (i.e., being 
infinitely barred from borro~ing),~~  more recent models have realized that the 
logic applies even if the penalties are of finite length. In particular, if the trans- 
gressor plays a “penance strategy” (i.e., inherently suffers from its transgres- 
32. The limiting case would be for the creditor country to make political threats; i.e., sovereign 
default can be met by  gunboat diplomacy. For various reasons, this limit is rarely reached these 
days. 
33. Important to this discussion is the assumption that the debtor nation wishes to remain in the 
international  financial community. The literature has also considered the situation in which a 
debtor nation has the alternative of entering financial autarky. In our analysis, we assume that no 
debtor nations would actually find it in their interest to enter into such a state. 
34. At  a more abstract level, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) have  shown that it is not generally 
worthwhile for small countries to establish a reputation for repayment. 
35.  A “grim strategy.” For more on the game theory behind reputation effects, see Fudenberg 
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sion), then the punishment phase need last only a short time. Given the fi- 
nancial disruptions associated with a major default, it could be argued that 
something resembling a penance strategy is being played after a default, which 
could help to explain why defaulting countries are soon welcomed back by the 
international financial ~ommunity.~~  In short, then, reputation effects serve as 
a principal-but  by no means perfect-way  of enforcing repayment. 
If reputation effects are indeed important, it might seem strange that we ever 
see sovereign default. In particular, why can’t the creditor and debtor renegoti- 
ate when default is anticipated,  thereby avoiding the costs incurred by actually 
defaulting? In fact, we do observe such negotiations in many instances (the 
equivalent of private workouts in the domestic context). A case could even be 
made that were creditor and debtor symmetrically informed about the debt- 
or’s circumstances,  we should always see renegotiation rather than default. The 
problem is that once again asymmetric information makes it difficult for the 
debtor to communicate its circumstances convincingly. Consequently,  the cred- 
itor worries that the debtor is trying to get away with repaying less than it 
actually could. The creditor, therefore, takes a harder stance in many instances 
than is warranted, leading ultimately to a default. Although the parties have an 
incentive to cooperate-analogously  to partners in  a game of  bridge-they 
misread each other’s signals, resulting in disaster. Nonetheless, the ability to 
renegotiate in advance of default can lessen the costs of default and reduce the 
impact of  sovereign risk. Moreover, as the creditor’s information about the 
debtor improves, this risk-reducing benefit is enhanced. 
In summary, sovereign risk is a significant problem in international  lending, 
one without an obvious analogue in domestic lending.37  Direct enforcement is 
impossible. Direct punishment (seizing the debtor nation’s assets abroad, trade 
boycotts, gunboat diplomacy, etc.) is likely to be applied in a haphazard way, 
at best, and so create few incentives for debtor nations to repay. The primary 
incentive, therefore, for repayment is reputation effects. In a world of certainty 
and symmetric information, reputation effects would be sufficient to deter all 
default; however, in the real world of uncertainty and asymmetric information, 
defaults will still occur. 
Monetary Spillovers 
In an autarkic country, the monetary regime is controlled by  the central 
bank. The level of interest rates (the “risk-free” rate in the discussion above) is 
36. Another, technical point is that much of  the early reputation models predicted that there 
would be no  transgressions in equilibrium. More recent work on “trigger strategies” has developed 
models in which, due to uncertainty, some transgressions occur in equilibrium (see, e.g., Green 
and Porter 1984). 
37. Actually, given the rules of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it could be argued that the managers and 
shareholders of  a company in debt have some ability to frustrate their creditors’ attempts to seize 
assets in the case of default. After default, a company coming out of Chapter  11 is often like a 
defaulted debtor nation; both are allowed to return to the capital markets. In this way, sovereign 
risk might not be so different from the risk faced in the domestic context. 382  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
determined by  the authorities; additional risk premiums that compensate for 
information and enforcement problems are determined by market forces. The 
aggregate level of short-run real interest rates is a purely domestic matter.38 
The situation is dramatically different in a country with free international 
capital mobility. While foreign capital can provide a healthy tonic of competi- 
tion for domestic financial markets, it also compromises the ability of the cen- 
tral bank to conduct monetary policy from a purely domestic perspective. 
The relationship between international lending and macroeconomic instabil- 
ity stems from two simple relations. First, the domestic monetary base-the 
most important component of the aggregate money supply-is  composed of 
domestic credit and international reserves. Second, the balance-of-payments 
accounting identity links international flows of goods, services, and capital to 
changes in international reserves. Exogenous foreign shocks result in capital 
flows that lead to shifts in reserves and corresponding movements in the do- 
mestic money supply and the macroeconomy. 
To make this concrete, consider a country’s balance of payments: 
Current account + Net capital flows = Net reserve flows. 
Countries with net capital inflows that more than compensate for any current 
account deficit are in “balance-of-payments  surplus” and experience rising lev- 
els of international reserves. But reserve flows are linked to the money supply 
since 
Money supply = International reserves + Domestic credit. 
So increases in international reserves lead to increases in the money supply, 
unless they  are deliberately counteracted by  the monetary authorities. The 
greater the degree of capital mobility, the faster and larger the reaction of net 
capital flows and the greater the impact on the money supply. Since the money 
supply is an important determinant of macroeconomic stability, undesired cap- 
ital flows can compromise macroeconomic performance. 
The first fundamental choice for a country with a nonzero balance of pay- 
ments is whether to stem the imbalance or allow it to continue. For the sake of 
simplicity, we consider the case of  a country with net capital inflows, which 
results in increasing international reserves.39  To  further sharpen our focus, as- 
sume too that the current account is balanced, and capital begins to flow into a 
country for purely foreign reasons.@ 
Allowing the capital to flow in might seem, at first blush, to be the obvious 
choice. After all, the country receives international reserves that can be kept 
for many purposes (e.g., defending the country’s currency in the future). But 
the increase in international reserves raises the money supply if domestic credit 
38. We assume that the monetary authority cannot alter real interest rates in the long run. 
39. A number of  Latin and Southeast Asian countries have been in this situation in the 1990s. 
40. The first assumption is made purely for convenience; the second is far from uncommon. For 
instance, the reduction of capital flows to Mexico resulting from increases in American interest 
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policy is left unchanged. This loosening of monetary policy can result in unde- 
sirable future inflation. It can also fuel bubbles in asset prices, especially stock, 
bond, and real estate prices. If domestic banks become heavily exposed to asset 
price risk, either through design or neglect, popping asset bubbles can bankrupt 
the financial system, as Sweden and Japan found out in the early 1990s and 
Thailand more recently. 
Still, even if the payments imbalance is allowed to continue it need not result 
in looser monetary policy. The central bank can offset increases in international 
reserves with a decline in domestic credit, usually sales of government bonds. 
This “sterilization” of reserve movements is not without its own perils though. 
Reductions of domestic credit tend to keep interest rates high. Since the gov- 
ernment pays a higher interest rate on its bonds than it receives on its foreign 
(reserve) holdings, sterilization represents a nontrivial cost to the government. 
Sterilization also encourages continued capital inflows, so that the cause of the 
problem-the  payments imbalance-persists.  Further, sterilization is at best 
only a temporary policy, since it is naturally limited by the size of the credit 
base. The evidence to date indicates that while there is some scope for steriliza- 
tion in the short run, there are few indications that sterilization is a viable 
policy over long periods of time.41 
A third problem of  allowing capital inflows to continue is that the inter- 
national borrowing has to be repaid in the future (ignoring the sovereign risk 
considerations discussed above). Wisely invested, foreign capital can yield re- 
turns that pay back the original lenders while also providing domestic benefits. 
But if borrowing from abroad is used to finance consumption, perhaps by de- 
laying painful but necessary fiscal adjustments, then repayment can be more 
difficult. Investing foreign capital in unprofitable projects with low returns is 
little better, as many Asian countries discovered in 1997. 
Finally, it is always wise to remember that what has flowed in can also flow 
out. Foreign capital has an awkward habit of fleeing a country at the worst times, 
as many countries have rediscovered; Mexico in 1994, Argentina in 1995, and 
Korea and Thailand in 1997 are perhaps the most important recent examples. 
Clearly, there are risks associated with allowing capital to continue to flow 
into a country for long periods of  time.42  The alternative is to stop the capital 
from coming in the first place. 
There are two conceptually different methods of stemming capital inflows. 
The first is simply to restrict capital flows through administrative  controls. Pro- 
viding insulation from international capital flows through fiat has long been a 
standard tactic for developing countries (as a glance through the IMF’s Ex- 
change Arrangements  and  Exchange Restrictions indicates). Chile is often 
cited as a country that avoided the tequila effect of 1995 because of its controls 
on capital inflows. Indeed, many  OECD countries imposed capital controls 
41. See chap. 4  of Ito and Folkerts-Landau (1996) for references on this issue. 
42. Deficits have comparable  problems but are usually even less sustainable, since international 
reserves are smaller than domestic credit for most countries. 384  Benjamin E. Hermalin and Andrew K. Rose 
throughout the long post-World  War  I1  boom and have  only removed them 
recently; France and Italy only reduced barriers in 1990. 
But legal restrictions on capital flows come at a cost. While international 
financial activity may be “naturally” limited because of the enforcement and 
information reasons discussed above, it may still be enormously beneficial for 
capital-poor countries or countries that need competitive international markets 
to discipline domestic markets. Restricting access to foreign pressures over 
long periods can reduce domestic growth as a result. Moreover, countries are 
understandably reluctant to compromise their long-term access to international 
capital markets for short-term reasons. 
Instead of permanently disrupting the linkage between the domestic and for- 
eign financial systems, a more reasonable approach to countering a capital in- 
flow may be to eliminate the underlying causes of the inflow. Both monetary 
and fiscal policy have important effects on the balance of payments and can be 
used to reduce or eliminate capital inflows. By lowering interest rates through 
the application of loose monetary policy, the monetary authorities can induce 
lower capital inflows directly. Alternatively, tighter fiscal policy can lower do- 
mestic absorption, thereby improving the current account and reducing net cap- 
ital inflows; a fixed exchange rate can be devalued toward the same end. 
While domestic policy instruments can be used to eliminate the underlying 
capital flows, the point remains: the independence of national macroeconomic 
policy is compromised as a result of international capital flows. In the case of un- 
wanted capital inflows, either domestic monetary policy must be loosened or 
fiscal policy must be tightened. Neither policy may be desirable from a purely 
domestic perspective. 
This argument is usually expressed in a more concise form that focuses on 
the purely monetary effects of capital inflows. Mundell’s celebrated “Incom- 
patible Trinity” states that international capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, 
and domestic monetary independence are mutually incompatible. A country 
may choose to stabilize its exchange rate for a variety of different reasons (e.g., 
to provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy or to encourage international 
trade by lowering exchange rate volatility). But once the country has decided 
to smooth its exchange rate, allowing unrestricted international capital flows 
comes at the risk of  monetary instability. More precisely, the country relin- 
quishes its ability to conduct monetary policy for purely domestic reasons be- 
cause maintaining the exchange rate becomes the objective of monetary policy. 
As a result, the country bears higher risks of business cycle fluctuations. And 
if  the country chooses instead to focus monetary policy on purely domestic 
objectives, this comes at the risk of unstable exchange rates and the instability 
that is associated with exchange rate variability. 
In sum, reducing barriers to international capital flows may provide a num- 
ber of microeconomic benefits, as discussed above. But the increased exposure 
to foreign capital means that the ability of the authorities to conduct indepen- 
dent policy oriented toward domestic objectives becomes more limited. Open- 385  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
ness and external stability (of  the exchange rate and balance of  payments) 
come at the cost of the increased risk of domestic fluctuations. 
Summary 
Both sovereign risk and the monetary effects of net capital flows are macro- 
economic issues that constitute extra risks from international  financial activity. 
Sovereign risk is an issue of concern for both lending and borrowing countries. 
Net creditors face the risk of expropriation and default, but borrowers are af- 
fected because of the resulting higher interest rates and loan limits. Similarly, 
the monetary regimes of both lending and borrowing countries are fundamen- 
tally affected by openness to international  capital flows; unwanted capital flows 
create macroeconomic instability. 
7.1.5  Conclusions 
In this paper we have provided a framework to analyze the risks to borrowers 
and lenders that are inherent in international  financial activity. Microeconomic 
risks in all financial activity stem from two basic problems. Imperfect informa- 
tion compromises the ability of lenders to monitor the behavior of borrowers; 
the inability of  borrowers and lenders to sign enforceable all-encompassing 
contracts at low cost also limits financial activity. Both of these problems are 
serious even in a purely domestic setting. And both are likely to be more prob- 
lematic when financial activity takes place across international  boundaries. At 
first glance, the low levels of international financial activity would seem to be 
unsurprising, except for countries with very different levels of capital, system- 
atically different risks, or inefficient domestic financial sectors (the very coun- 
tries that typically restrict international capital flows). This is especially true 
when we take into account two macroeconomic risks that have no analogue in 
a purely domestic setting: sovereign risk and monetary spillovers. 
Still, many fundamental sources of risks are slowly being overcome. Infor- 
mation flows more easily than ever before, and the advantages that domestic 
residents have over foreigners in both enforcement and information are being 
eroded. Economic liberalization, increased dependence on foreign trade, and 
reduction in the state sectors of  many  countries reduce the risk of  nations’ 
defaulting on their debt or nations’ using their sovereignty to thwart collection 
of debts from domestic firms. As these trends continue, we should see greater 
amounts of international capital flow and lower exposure to risk. 
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Derivatives in International Capital Flows 
The explosive growth of derivative products in the past fifteen years has paral- 
leled the growth of cross-border gross capital flows. The use of derivative prod- 
ucts has been a major factor in the growth of cross-border capital movements 
for several reasons. First, by allowing the separation of various risks associated 
with cross-border investment, it makes such investment more attractive. Port- 
folio diversification becomes more likely, with a consequent increase in gross 
international flows. Moreover, impediments to movement of capital in search 
of higher real yields weaken, with a consequent increase in net flows. Various 
dimensions of risk can be moved across borders to markets that find them less 
unattractive. Indeed, such potential gains in the efficiency of the international 
allocation of capital has redefined a major, profitable segment of the interna- 
tional wholesale banking market. 
The problems associated with the rise of derivatives stem partly from the 387  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
same source as the benefits: the increased ability to separate and market risks 
means that some counterparties can assume riskier positions more readily than 
in the past. Coupled with the existence of weak financial systems and the inher- 
ent opaqueness of  derivative positions due to obsolete accounting systems, 
slow reporting, and unprepared supervisors, derivatives can be used to leverage 
financial safety nets in efforts to double up lost financial bets.  Often, such 
activity must move offshore to evade detection and naturally generates a gross 
international capital flow. Moreover, derivatives can be used readily to evade 
onshore prudential regulation and capital or exchange control, thereby generat- 
ing yet more measured capital flows. 
Interpretations of the causes and dynamics of the sudden capital flow rever- 
sals associated with balance-of-payments crises generally are based on on- 
balance-sheet information. In the presence of  derivatives, however, such data 
can generate false inferences about the sources of a crisis and lead to misin- 
formed policy prescriptions. They confound the sources of the crisis: whether 
it stems from foreign speculators, panicked green-screen traders, or domestic 
insiders armed with knowledge about weak fundamentals. In addition, in the 
presence of  large volumes of derivatives, claims that crises are generated by 
such inappropriate policies as an excessively short maturity of the public debt 
can be mirages of on-balance-sheet accounting. 
Even on-balance-sheet data for measuring the quality of international capital 
flows-the  capital accounts of  the balance-of-payments data-are  obscured 
by derivatives used to enhance risk or evade controls or even for benign pur- 
poses. Subaccount data, such as portfolio investment, equity investment, for- 
eign direct investment, or long- or short-maturity fixed interest rate lending, 
are illusory in the presence of substantial volumes of derivative products. 
The remainder of this essay will provide general descriptions of some of the 
basic derivative products, along with recent data on the extent of the market in 
derivatives.' After a discussion of the positive effects of derivatives-the  abil- 
ity to refine the management of  risk-the  paper will examine the negative 
aspects of these products: their role in enhancing risk taking, in evading pru- 
dential regulations, taxes, and controls, in channeling the dynamics of currency 
and financial crises, and in obscuring the meaning of  capital accounts data 
from the standard balance-of-payments accounts. 
7.2.1  Some Basic Derivative Products 
While the list of exotic derivative products expands almost daily, most der- 
ivatives outstanding are relatively simple, consisting mainly of forward con- 
tracts, swaps, and basic options, whose notional values are indicative of  the 
magnitude of  the market risks that are being acquired or hedged. Structured 
notes, however, are implicitly highly leveraged products whose notional values 
1. The paper is an adaptation and expansion of ideas developed in Garber (1996). Garber and 
Lall(1996), and Folkerts-Landau  and Garber (1997). 388  Peter M. Garber 
generally underestimate significantly the magnitude of the risks taken. Here I 
will concentrate only on a few types of swaps and structured notes. 
A generic swap of yields is an exchange of  the percentage return on one 
type of asset during a given period for the percentage return on another asset, 
multiplied by a predefined notional value to convert percentages to cash equiv- 
alents. Both returns are observable in security or banking markets. The swap 
may involve a periodic exchange of yields for a fixed period of time and settle- 
ment only of the net amount due. Specifically, for a given currency, an interest 
rate swap is an exchange of a fixed interest return for a floating return or per- 
haps one floating interest rate for another. An equity swap or total return swap 
generally is a periodic exchange of the return on a given share or equity index, 
including dividends and capital gains, for some interest yield, multiplied by a 
notional value in a given currency. 
Interest and equity swaps do not involve initial and final payments of princi- 
pal or notional value, although the counterparty with the greater credit risk 
may have to deliver some collateral. Currency and foreign exchange swaps do 
require initial and final delivery of principal. A foreign exchange swap, gen- 
erally a very short term deal, is a combination of a spot sale of currency and a 
forward purchase-it  packages in a single deal both foreign exchange market 
legs of  the familiar interest rate parity arbitrage operation. Foreign exchange 
swaps coupled with spot exchange sales are the standard wholesale market 
technique for establishing forward currency positions. A currency swap sim- 
ilarly requires an initial and final exchange of  principal amounts of  the two 
currencies at predetermined forward exchange rates, but it is of longer maturity 
and involves periodic exchanges of interest on the principal amounts in the two 
currencies. A currency swap can be interpreted as a bundle of  forward ex- 
change contracts with sequentially lengthening maturities. 
A structured note requires the delivery of a given amount of principal by the 
buyer to the seller, as in a standard bond purchase. The payoff of either interest 
or principal is set as a function of some underlying market value, such as an 
exchange rate or interest rate. Depending on the nature of the formula, the pay- 
off may deliver multiples of the initial principal; or on the downside, the prin- 
cipal may be wiped out. 
7.2.2  Data on the Extent of Derivative Markets 
The 1995 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) survey of market partici- 
pants in the major and many minor financial centers indicated that the notional 
value of  over-the-counter (OTC) derivative products outstanding was  $47.5 
trillion in March 1995, and of this about 55 percent were cross-border transac- 
tiom2  Most of this amount consisted of simple interest rate products such as 
2. “The global nature of the markets is underlined by  the large amount of business contracts 
with counter parties located abroad” (BIS 1995,24). 
In a survey of  its members, the International Swap Dealers Association found that outstanding 
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swaps, and most cross-border transactions occurred between industrial coun- 
tries.3  For other derivative products, there are, nevertheless, large notional val- 
ues outstanding in absolute terms-equity-based  products and structured notes 
and options that may be quite complex-and  these are also used to an ever 
expanding extent in key emerging market countries. 
Of the $47.5 trillion in OTC notional values, 61 percent was in interest rate 
instruments, and 37 percent was in foreign exchange instruments, including 
outright forwards and swaps. Outstanding equity contracts amounted to 1.25 
percent and commodity-related instruments were 0.75 percent of the overall 
notional value, or about $590 billion and $350 billion, respectively. Exchange- 
traded contracts outstanding amounted to $8 trillion, almost all of which were 
interest rate contracts. Gross market values or replacement costs were $2.2 
trillion for OTC contracts, about 4.6 percent of the notional value.4 
Of the interest rate products, 50 percent were cross-border; while 56 percent 
of foreign exchange products were cross-border, for an overall total of about 
$26 trillion (BIS 1995, 23, table D3). For equity products, cross-border posi- 
tion data are not reported by the BIS. For comparison, the total stock of domes- 
tic and international securities in the OECD countries was $26.3 trillion, and 
international banking assets excluding security holdings were $8.3 trillion in 
March 1995.5 
Thus, if applied one to one to outstanding securities, the stock of both OTC 
and exchange-traded derivatives was  sufficient to have  repackaged the risk 
characteristics of all domestic and international securities and all international 
banking assets. Of the outstanding volume of OTC products, however, about 
57  percent of the local and cross-border deals were between dealers to bal- 
ance positions. 
7.2.3  Why Derivatives Can Increase Cross-Border 
Movement of Capital 
It is worthwhile at this point to consider a brief set of examples of derivative 
products. These examples will be used throughout the remainder of the paper 
to show how derivatives might aid in the diversification of portfolios, reduce 
or enhance risk, evade prudential regulations, and avoid capital controls and 
sive a survey as that of the BIS. Exchange-based contracts outstanding were stagnant over the year, 
however. See BIS (1997, 130, 136). 
3. Thus the problem of inferring market risk from balance-of-payments data applies especially 
with regard to the positions of industrial countries. Academic investigations of the lack of cross- 
border portfolio diversification based on capital account data are seriously compromised by this 
gap in these data. 
4.  Most derivative products are priced on initiation of the contract so that they have zero market 
value. As underlying market prices move through the life of a contract, the contract-which  is a 
bet on the movement of  the underlying prices-acquires  positive absolute value. This value is 
called “replacement cost.” 
5. Notional amounts do not reflect payment obligations. They do reflect price exposure in the 
underlying markets, and they are useful for comparison with the underlying amounts outstanding. 
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taxes. In these activities, they can create gross international capital flows that 
otherwise might not have materialized, but they also can confound the nature 
of the cross-border flows that do occur. Some of the derivative types in the fol- 
lowing examples were important in the Mexican exchange rate crisis of 1994- 
95, so they will be developed in the Mexican context, which is used as a back- 
drop for many of the succeeding conclusions; but they are generic products 
and are used worldwide for the same reasons they were used in Mexico. 
Currency Swap 
The initial example is a plain vanilla currency swap in its most common 
context. Suppose that IBM sells deutsche mark bonds in Germany to shave 
some basis points from its finance costs-German  fund managers find IBM 
securities desirable for diversification purposes but insist on deutsche mark 
settlement. IBM wants dollar liabilities, however, because of  the nature of its 
earnings stream. It enters a currency swap with a U.S. bank, equivalent to a 
stack of forward exchange contracts in which IBM pays dollars at predeter- 
mined exchange rates and receives the marks needed to cover its bond obliga- 
tions. In its net position, IBM is then a dollar debtor, and the bank has acquired 
the currency risk. Similarly, Daimler-Benz also can save basis points by plac- 
ing its bonds with  a U.S. pension fund, which also seeks diversification of 
credit risk, but it must denominate the bonds in dollars. Another, opposite cur- 
rency swap is born, perhaps with the original U.S. bank as the natural, ultimate 
counterparty. The U.S. bank makes the market and takes a spread but has no 
net currency position.6 
There is no net international movement of capital, but the two bond issues 
appear on balance sheet as gross capital flows to be captured by  the periodic 
snapshots of the balance-of-payments  data. In the absence of the swaps, neither 
borrower may have found it beneficial to go to an offshore market and may 
have confined its borrowing to domestic lenders, leaving no tracks in the data 
on  gross  international capital movements. As  off-balance-sheet items, the 
swaps are not reported and are not captured in balance-of-payments data, ex- 
cept to the extent that collateral is demanded by the market-making bank from 
one or both final counterparties. 
Single Currency Interest Rate Swaps 
It is natural that gross capital flows should arise from currency swaps, be- 
cause a cross-border flow is at the heart of  the swap deal. With interest rate 
swaps in a single currency, which account about 60 percent of the outstanding 
OTC notional value, the natural international aspect disappears. Nevertheless, 
such swaps are frequently associated with capital flows. Suppose that a highly 
rated U.S. company borrows fixed interest dollars in London and enters a swap 
6. See Feldstein (1994, 13-14)  for further analysis of  net vs. gross movement of capital in the 
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as a floating rate payer with a bank-it  will pay three-month dollar LIBOR 
multiplied by  the notional value of the swap at the same maturity as its bond. 
On net, the U.S. company has converted its required service payments into 
floating rates, which it prefers. The bank’s balancing customer might be a lesser 
rated Italian company that sells floating rate dollar-denominated securities in 
London but wants to pay  fixed interest. In the absence of the swap, the U.S. 
company might have preferred to borrow at floating rates directly in the United 
States, but it is encouraged to borrow in London because the swap allows it to 
shave basis points from the deal, and similarly for the Italian company. The 
funds for the principal of the two loans have to come from somewhere. Who- 
ever would have bought the U.S. company’s potential U.S. bond issue-say  a 
U.S. resident-will  now buy its more attractive Eurobond issue, and similarly 
for the Italian company. Again, there are no net cross-border flows but positive 
gross flows. Before the advent of interest rate swaps, this gain from trade be- 
tween the two companies would not have been possible, and the deals would 
have been financed directly from national sources. 
Tesobono Swaps and Repos 
The interest rate swaps described above involved exchanging fixed for float- 
ing rate yields in a single currency or fixed rate for fixed rate yields in two 
different currencies for relatively long maturities. Similar deals are made in 
large volumes for shorter maturities. Here, the Tesobono swap will serve as a 
useful example of such deals. 
Tesobono swaps were offshore derivative operations used by Mexican banks 
as a means of leveraging Tesobono holdings, the notorious treasury bills of the 
Mexican government indexed to the peso-dollar exchange rate. In a Tesobono 
swap, a Mexican bank received the yield earned on Tesobonos and delivered 
dollar LIBOR plus some additional basis points, multiplied by  a notional 
amount of dollars. 
The leverage involved in Tesobono swaps can be most readily examined by 
analyzing first the nearly equivalent Tesobono repurchase agreement. As  an 
example, consider a New York investment firm that is willing to lend dollars 
for one year against Tesobono collateral through a repurchase agreement. The 
firm engages in a repurchase agreement with a Mexican bank to buy Tesobonos 
at some agreed price and to resell them in a year at the original price plus a 
dollar interest rate.’ In the example in table 7.5, a Mexican bank sells $1 billion 
of Tesobonos to a New York firm for $800 million with an agreement to re- 
purchase the Tesobonos in one year for the original price plus the LIBOR plus 
1 percent interest. The yield on Tesobonos is 8 percent while dollar LIBOR is 
5 percent. Effectively, the Mexican bank has financed a $1 billion Tesobono 
position by borrowing $800 million, although official data on Tesobono hold- 
ings will indicate that a foreign address holds the Tesobonos. The gain to the 
7. In the swap form of the deal, of course, only net amounts were due in each settlement period. 392  Peter M. Garber 
Table 7.5  Tesobono Repurchase Agreement 
1. Tesobono yield = 8% 
LIBOR yield = 5% 
Maturity = I year 
agreement to repurchase in one year for $800 million X (1 + LIBOR + 1%) 
2. Mexican bank sells $1 billion of Tesobonos to New York firm for $800 million with 
3. New York firm funds 80% of Mexican bank's  position-has  $200 million of margin (20%) 
4.  New York firm is a foreign address holding $1 billion of Tesobonos 
5. Mexican bank gets Tesobono return at 8% on $1 billion, finances 80% at LIBOR + 1%: 2% 
6. New York firm borrows $800 million at LIBOR, lends at LIBOR + 1% 
spread 
Table 7.6  Tesobono Swap 
1. New York firm delivers Tesobono yield for LIBOR + 1% with Mexican bank on $1 billion 
2. New York firm requires deposit of 20% margin-$200  million 
3. To hedge, New York firm buys $1 billion of Tesobonos, financed by $200 million margin from 
4.  Foreign address holds Tesobonos 
5. Mexican bank puts up $200 million of own funds to get $1 billion of Tesobono yield 
notional principal 
Mexican bank, $800 million borrowed at LIBOR 
Mexican bank is that it pays LIBOR plus 100 to finance Tesobonos that may 
pay the equivalent of LIBOR plus 300. The gain to the U.S. lender is that it 
gets to place dollar funds at LIBOR plus 100 against good collateral while it 
borrows at LIBOR. 
A  Tesubono swap  places both parties in  the same risk position as a re- 
purchase agreement. Table 7.6  indicates the positions taken if the financing of 
the Mexican bank's  Tesobono position takes the form of  a Tesobono swap. 
Suppose the New York  firm swaps Tesobono yield in return for LrSOR plus 
100 basis points against a $1 billion notional principal. It requires $200 million 
as collateral from its Mexican counterparty, that is, a margin deposit of 20 per- 
cent to guarantee compliance with the contract. The payoffs to the two counter- 
parties are identical to those under the repurchase agreement. To hedge, the 
New York firm will purchase $1 billion in Tesobonos directly from the market, 
paid from the $200 million margin and $800 million borrowed at LIBOR. As 
before, the Tesobonos will be held by  a foreign address, although Mexican 
domestic residents will bear the Tesobono risk. 
In either form, these operations serve to channel a net flow of capital of $800 
million into Mexico, which ultimately finances the government. Gross flow 
data picked up in the normal balance-of-payments operation will measure an 
inflow of $1 billion worth of Tesobono purchases and an outflow in the form 
of  bank deposits for the collateral of  $200 million. The swap, however, dis- 
guises the nature of the flow. Superficially, it appears that foreign lenders are 
buying Mexican government debt in the form of Tesobonos-that  is, they are 
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Table 7.7  Equity Swap 
1. New York firm delivers total return on Telmex for LlBOR + 3% with Mexican bank on $1 
2. New York firm requires deposit of 20% margin-$200  million 
3. To hedge, New York  firm buys $1 billion of Telmex American Depository Receipts, financed 
4. Foreign address holds Mexican shares 
5. Mexican bank puts up $200 million of own funds to get $1 billion of stock market risk 
billion notional principal 
by $200 million collateral from Mexican bank, $800 million borrowed at LIBOR 
of the Mexican public debt. In fact, they are making short-term dollar loans, 
while Mexican residents are holding the Tesobono risk. On the national bal- 
ance sheet-consolidating  the government and domestic banking sectors- 
Mexico is a short-term borrower of dollars. 
Equity Swaps 
Table 7.7  presents an example to show that an equity swap establishes a 
leveraged position in  shares, with funding coming from an offshore source. 
Again, a Mexico-based example will be used with an eye on later exposition, 
but such cross-border deals are commonplace. 
Suppose that a Mexican bank agrees to swap the total return over one year 
on Telmex for dollar LIBOR plus 300 basis points on a notional amount of $1 
billion. Its offshore counterparty, a New York securities house, requires $200 
million in collateral.  To hedge its short equity position, the New York firm then 
directly buys $1 billion worth of Telmex shares, thereby appearing as a foreign 
investor in Mexican shares. The New York firm is taking a long position in 
short-term dollar loans while the Mexican bank has a long position in Telmex 
shares and a short position in short-term dollar loans. The Mexican bank has 
acquired $1 billion of Telmex risk by putting up $200 million of collateral in 
New York. 
Again, balance-of-payments accounts will report a gross inflow of $1 billion 
worth of  equity purchases for portfolio investment or perhaps foreign direct 
investment and an  outflow of  $200 million in bank deposits. The Mexican 
bank-and  therefore the national balance sheet-holds  the equity risk, while 
the foreign address is only a short-term dollar lender. 
Structured Notes 
Structured notes exist in many forms, but the example studied here will de- 
termine the payoff on what might be described as a “bullish obligation on the 
peso,” as presented in table 7.K8 For example, a Mexican bank or its foreign 
subsidiary might buy a note with a twenty-nine-day maturity from a New York 
investment house for $10 million. The coupon on the note and the principal on 
the note are payable in dollars. Suppose that the coupon offered on the note is 
8. The description of this note was taken from an indicative term sheet issued by Donaldson, 
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Table 7.8 
1. ice,,  = .85 annual 
2. i,  = .05 annual 
3. Maturity of contract = 29 days 
4. Overall payoff of the note = Coupon + Principal 
= 1.95 * 7.0/Pm  * 291360 + 1 + 3 [(7.0 -  P,)/f‘,,,l 
5.  Some arithmetic to determine implied dollar and new peso (Npeso) positions: 
Bullish Obligation on the Peso 
Payoff = (-2  + 3.157 * 7.O/Pm)  X $10 million 
= -$20  million + $31.57 million * 7.0/P, 
= -$20  million + Npesos 221 millionlf‘, 
Present values: 
Current dollar position = -$19.92  million 
Current Npeso = 209.95 million = $29.99 million 
195 percent annually multiplied by  the ratio of the current spot value of the 
peso to the peso-dollar exchange rate at maturity. Interest rates on peso paper 
such as Cetes-peso-denominated  treasury bills-are  85 percent per annum 
and 5 percent on dollar paper. The principal repayment also depends negatively 
on the peso value of the dollar at maturity-suppose  it will be [l + 3 X (7.0 
-  P,)/P,]  X $10 million, where 7.0 is the initial peso value of the dollar and 
P,,,  is the value at maturity. In an extreme case, if  the peso has depreciated by 
50 percent at maturity, from say 7.00 to  14.0 pesos per dollar, the principal 
repayment will be  -$5  million. The overall payoff is then  -$3.25  milli~n.~ 
Conversely, if the peso appreciates significantly, the payoff can be a multiple 
of the initial investment. Table 7.8 shows that this is the payoff  structure of a 
position that is currently short about $19.92 million at a market dollar interest 
rate of 5 percent per year and long 209.95 million pesos at a market peso in- 
terest rate of 85 percent per year. Effectively, the initial $10 million investment 
has been leveraged threefold and invested in peso paper. 
Overall, through the payoff formula, the New York investment house would 
have a position equivalent to being short 209.95 million worth of peso paper 
and long $19.92 million worth of dollar loans. In addition, it has the initial $10 
million from the sale of  the note. To hedge, it may wish to buy the peso by 
investing in one-month Cetes while simultaneously selling the dollars in the 
position. It would then appear in the on-balance-sheet accounts as a foreign 
buyer of a peso-denominated asset rather than as a dollar-denominated lender, 
which is its true position.’O 
If the seller of  the note hedges the position, the balance-of-payments ac- 
counts will report a net inflow of about $20 million. This will result from a 
gross inflow of about $30 million in the form of portfolio purchases of short- 
9. As a safety feature for the buyer, such structured notes cap the potential losses. E.g., in the 
actual “bullish obligation,” in no case would the principal redemption plus coupon payment be 
less than zero. This adds a put option feature to the note. 
10. As an additional feature, such notes contain clauses that state that the notes will pay zero if 
there is a “default event” on Cetes or an “exchange control event.” This is a sort of poison pill that 
automatically wipes out part of domestic bank capital in a country that imposes such policies. 395  Risks to Lenders and Borrowers in International Capital Markets 
term, peso-denominated government paper and an outflow of $10 million in 
the form of a Mexican bank’s  purchase of  a short-maturity, dollar-denomi- 
nated note. 
7.2.4  Circumventing Prudential Regulations and Capital Controls 
In addition to their normal uses in portfolio diversification or risk reduction, 
derivatives can be used to increase risk-one  side of the deal may be specu- 
lating. In  weakly regulated, undercapitalized financial systems, derivatives 
provide a perfect opportunity for financial intermediaries to acquire risky po- 
sitions in attempts to recover capital. This section will show how derivatives 
such as those in the examples developed earlier can be used to escape pruden- 
tial regulation and capital controls. 
Evading Prudential Regulation 
Prudential regulations of varying stringency are well accepted across differ- 
ent financial systems, but they are especially important in the presence of large 
capital inflows. Such inflows, in particular, increase the potential to have sys- 
temic failures in the financial sector because of  the rapid expansion of bank 
balance sheets into unfamiliar business. If  capital suddenly flows into a country 
in quantity, there will be a general expansion of the financial system and invest- 
ment projects; and it is not clear that a large fraction of the investments will be 
placed in “good” projects. There is a belief among regulators and academics 
that inflows are often the results of various investment fads-ultimately,  inves- 
tor disappointment over the payoffs from these investments will lead to an at- 
tempt to withdraw funds. Therefore, regulations are imposed-such  as reserve 
requirements, limits on lending to individuals, firms, or sectors, liquidity re- 
quirements against domestic or foreign exchange liabilities, net foreign cur- 
rency exposure limits, and capital requirements-which  aim at channeling 
inflows away from banks and risky projects. Similarly, a ban on holding se- 
curities on margin or on short sales will mean that equity holders will not be 
forced to join the general scramble for cash in a liquidity crisis and thereby 
reduce the potential magnitude of the demand for cash. Nevertheless, bans on 
margin buying tend to push such activity offshore, through OTC derivative 
markets. 
Banks can readily avoid regulations either in a straightforward manner or by 
going offshore or engaging in off-balance-sheet activities, which violate the 
intent, if not the letter, of regulations. We  will examine how structured notes 
and equity swaps can be used to avoid such regulation. 
Structured Notes 
As shown earlier, structured notes are investment vehicles with coupon pay- 
ments and principal repayments driven by formulas that can leverage the initial 
capital invested. Nevertheless, in value accounting systems they can be booked 
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More than simply magnifying the usual market risks associated with invest- 
ment positions, structured notes provide an easy method for circumventing  pru- 
dential regulations on currency positions or interest rate mismatches. 
In the context of section 7.2.3’s example, booked as claims of Mexican insti- 
tutions with dollar principal and dollar payoffs, these notes in fact were cur- 
rency bets that created a short dollar and long peso currency position to take 
advantage of positive interest rate spreads between peso and dollar money mar- 
kets.” The notes were reported by  Mexican banks as dollar assets, allowing 
them to offset short dollar positions in meeting regulatory limits on net foreign 
currency positions. In addition, some banks could count them to satisfy their 
liquidity coefficient required for foreign-currency-denominated liabilities be- 
cause their short maturity allowed them to be classified as liquid deposits. In 
the event of a depreciation of the currency, banks might have a much larger net 
short dollar position and greater losses than regulators had realized. 
Held in this way, the structured note of the example is a financial engineering 
device to circumvent prudential regulation. Only the principal was booked, in 
accordance with value accounting principles. The structured note payoff  for- 
mula component was not booked-it  is an off-balance-sheet item. That is the 
accounting trick-one  can alter the nature of the booking through a compli- 
cated payoff formula. The use of  the trick, however, requires an outflow of 
capital in the form of principal. Thus a net inflow of $20 million takes the form 
of a gross outflow of $10 million and a gross inflow of $30 million. 
Equity Swaps 
As a means of taking a position in stocks, the market in equity swaps can be 
used to avoid financial market regulations against such positions. Such regula- 
tions may ban buying securities on margin or short selling or limit the share 
positions of foreign addresses.lZ  The benefits to market participants of the exis- 
tence of this market are obvious. Speculators can leverage and gain larger po- 
sitions, and hedgers of long positions held either directly or implicitly in the 
form of  options can short stock to cover their positions. Again, net short-term 
dollar foreign borrowing for domestic stock purchases takes the form of a gross 
outflow in the form of dollar-denominated margin and a larger gross inflow in 
the form of a stock purchase by a foreign address. 
Avoiding Capital Import Taxes or Controls 
Taxes or outright bans on the acquisition by  foreign addresses of  domestic 
securities have emerged in recent years as a means of stemming capital inflows. 
11. In Malaysia, these instruments, known as “principal adjusted coupon notes,” serve the same 
purpose of  providing leverage in domestic currency positions to foreigners through foreign ex- 
change financing. Regulation precluded foreign addresses from directly holding short-term ringgit 
claims onshore. 
12. Offshore equity swap markets also exist for Malaysia, Korea, and Thailand, among others, 
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They sometimes have been imposed differentially by maturity of asset and by 
type of asset. Often, such taxes have been successful in that they have placed a 
wedge between domestic and foreign yields on similar assets. They can be 
breached by the usual invoicing subterfuges, but market participants have also 
used financial engineering to circumvent the taxes. Specifically, suppose that 
an enforceable tax is placed uniformly on all forms of gross inflows. Then any 
positive net inflow will incur the tax, but gross transactions  will move offshore. 
As an example, instead of acquiring an equity position directly, a foreign inves- 
tor will buy an offshore equity swap from a domestic resident who can hedge 
without a tax. If the domestic resident has a lower credit rating, an export of 
capital in the form of margin will be recorded. There will be no taxable inflow, 
but foreigners can take risk positions in domestic assets.I3 
If the tax is differential across types of assets acquired from abroad, the net 
inflow will tend to take the form that incurs the lowest tax. Similarly, if differ- 
ential controls are imposed allowing equity investment but limiting short-term 
fixed interest inflows, the flows will enter through the least restrictive door. The 
risk and maturity characteristics of the inflow can then be resculpted through 
offshore derivatives to a more desirable form. For instance, if  equity invest- 
ment is given better treatment than short-term fixed interest securities or bank 
deposits, the inflow will take the form of a stock acquisition together with an 
equity swap that converts it on net into a floating interest loan of foreign cur- 
rency. Even the maturity of the loan can be adjusted with an attachment by the 
lender of a stringent margining provision that permits the offshore creditor to 
realize cash on call. 
7.2.5  The Role of Derivatives in Crisis-Driven  Capital Outflows 
Where such markets exist, forward contracts are the speculator's instrument 
of choice in implementing an attack on a currency, the beginning of a sudden 
outflow of capital. Positions in forward contracts can arise suddenly or be built 
up gradually in the expectation of an impending devaluation. Such derivatives 
serve merely to effect a crisis that is emerging from other causes. Other deriva- 
tive products, already outstanding in large volumes, may reflect an environ- 
ment in which such speculation may be successful and may even determine 
the dynamics of the currency and financial crisis that ensues. 
This section will show how forward contracts transmit an impending attack 
on a central bank's  reserves through foreign exchange swap and spot exchange 
markets.14 Next, using the examples developed earlier from the Mexican case, 
13. In the case of Chilean equity, market sources report that offshore equity swaps are used 
regularly to permit trading in Chilean equity. They also report serious, though as yet unsuccessful, 
financial engineering research efforts to crack directly the Chilean tax on capital imports in the 
form of a uncompensated deposit requirement. 
14. This section has been adapted from the exposition on the mechanics of speculative attacks 
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it will show how the existence of  these products operated to determine the 
dynamics of  exchange markets leading into the currency crisis of December 
1994, to determine the magnitude of the final attack, and to drive the foreign 
exchange market turbulence in the months after the attack. 
The Mechanics of Speculative Attack 
This section covers the mechanics of exchange market operations in specu- 
lative attacks. It shows how transactions in forward exchange work their way 
through the banking system and how they are financed. It discusses in particu- 
lar the effect of reducing credit to speculators, either through interest rate in- 
creases or, more directly, through controls. 
Speculators  generally  attack  a  weak  currency  by  selling  the  currency 
through forward contracts to a bank at relatively long maturities, for example, 
thirty days.15 Whether a customer speculates through a short sale or hedges a 
long position, the international banking system handles a forward sale of  a 
currency in the same way. As standard practice to balance the long position in 
the weak currency that this transaction initiates, the counterparty bank will 
immediately sell the weak currency spot for the conventional two-day settle- 
ment. Although its currency position is then balanced, the bank still has a matu- 
rity mismatch in both currencies: it can borrow the weak currency overnight to 
cover settlement of the spot sale, but it will receive the currency in thirty days 
through the forward contract. It faces the opposite maturity mismatch with its 
strong currency position. To close this maturity mismatch, a bank typically will 
transact a foreign exchange swap. These are customary wholesale operations 
executed by banks writing forward contracts to customers, in both normal peri- 
ods and speculative episodes. 
Table 7.9 presents a concrete example of such a forward transaction. In this 
example, the weak currency is the baht and the strong currency is the dollar. 
Suppose that the forward and spot exchange rates between the dollar and the 
baht are 25 baht per U.S. dollar. In the first step, a customer sells 2,500 baht 
forward for $100 to a bank. This is an off-balance-sheet item for the bank, but 
it has payment implications like any on-balance-sheet transaction. The pay- 
ment and receipt implications for the bank are displayed in the first panel. The 
bank will receive 2,500 baht and pay $100 in one month. These are the same 
movements of funds that the bank would face if it were long a baht Bank of 
Thailand bill and short a U.S. Treasury bill. To eliminate the currency mis- 
match, the bank immediately sells 2,500 baht for dollar spot exchange, the 
payment implications of which are combined with those of the forward con- 
15. Forward sales may also be launched by hedging programs implemented by fund managers, 
nonfinancial corporations, and market makers. Speculators may also attack a currency by buying 
put options on the currency. From the perspective of the counterparty bank, this creates a long 
forward position in the weak currency in an amount indicated by the option pricing formula used 
by the bank. The bank's  hedging program will respond in the same way as if the bank had entered 
directly into a forward contract with its counterparty. See Garber and Spencer (1995) on the effects 
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Table 7.9  Receipts and Payments to Counterparty Bank Arising from Forward 
Contract Operations 
Receipt  Payment 
Step I: Forward Contract = Currency Mismatch 
$100 in one month  2,500 Baht in one month 
Step 2: Forward Contract + Spot Sale = Maturity Mismatch 
2,500 Baht in one month (forward) 
$100 in two days (spot) 
2,500 Baht in one month (forward) 
2,500 Baht in two days (swap) 
$100 in one month (swap) 
$100 in two days (spot) 
2,500 Baht in two days (spot) 
$100 in one month (forward) 
2,500 Baht in one month (swap) 
2,500 Baht in two days (spot) 
$100 in one month (forward) 
$100 in two days (swap) 
Step 3: Forward + Spot + Swap = Balanced Position 
tract in the second step. The currency positions are now balanced, but there 
remains a maturity mismatch in each currency-one-month  baht are funded 
with rollover baht and rollover dollars are funded with one-month dollars. To 
eliminate the maturity mismatch, the bank immediately undertakes a one- 
month foreign exchange swap, exchanging $100 for 2,500 baht spot and 2,500 
baht for $100 thirty days forward. The complete payment implications for the 
bank are displayed in the third step: the bank has eliminated market exchange 
and interest rate risk through these transactions. 
This example indicates that a baht-dollar forward contract is equivalent to a 
foreign exchange swap combined with a spot exchange transaction. Also, on 
its origination, a forward sale of baht by the customer immediately generates 
a spot sale of baht by the bank. 
Who is the ultimate counterparty in these transactions? In time of  crisis, 
there are few spot market buyers of the weak currency, so a central bank de- 
fending an exchange rate level must appear as the counterparty through its ex- 
change market intervention. 
A customer in the forward market may be a central bank, which can inter- 
vene in the foreign exchange market to defend parity by  buying its currency 
forward rather than spot. If the central bank's  forward purchase of its currency 
matches a forward sale of some other customer of the banking system, all the 
swap and spot transactions of  the banking system will balance; specifically, 
spot exchange sales will be matched with purchases at the parity exchange rate. 
Thus the central bank's  forward intervention will absorb the spot sales of its 
currency without the central bank's  having to intervene directly in the spot 
market. By  entering a forward contract, the central bank implicitly supplies 
domestic currency credit directly to the short seller of its currency. The short 
seller in this example is obligated to deliver the weak currency to the central 
bank on the value date of  the forward contract, effectively a loan from the 
central bank. 
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would be willing net suppliers of weak currency credit. Nevertheless, to fuel a 
speculative attack, the world banking system must in aggregate provide credit 
in the weak currency to the short sellers. This is evident in the first step in table 
7.9, where the bank's  baht receipts from the forward contract embody a one- 
month baht loan to the short seller. If the central bank does not supply the credit 
directly through forward intervention, the credit must come either through its 
money market operations or its standing facilities. In any crisis, the baht pro- 
vided by  the banking system are a pass-through of  credit from the Bank of 
Thailand, which must be the ultimate counterparty in both legs of the position- 
balancing transactions of the banking system. The bank in the example must 
find a counterparty bank to engage in the swap. By entering into a one-month 
baht foreign exchange swap, the counterparty bank effectively lends baht spot 
to be repaid in one month. When the baht are sold on the spot market, they are 
bought by  the Bank of  Thailand-and  the other regional central banks that 
support it-in  the campaign to defend the exchange rate. In lending spot baht 
through the swap, the counterparty bank acquires the baht needed for spot de- 
livery either by  discounting paper through the standing facilities of the Bank 
of Thailand or through outright sale or sale with repurchase through the Bank 
of Thailand's market operations. 
Derivatives and the Dynamics of Capital Flow Reversals 
Even in countries where currency forward contracts did not play a role in a 
sudden reversal in capital flows, other derivative products may be present in 
sufficient quantities to affect the dynamics of a crisis. The Mexican peso crisis 
of 1994 is such a case. Speculators did not use the forward market suddenly to 
short sell the peso. Rather, outstanding products of the sort outlined earlier 
drove the near-in movements of capital going into and coming out of the deval- 
uation of the peso. 
The derivative positions that drove the crisis were established by  a weak 
banking system hungry for current income. The Mexican groups that had pur- 
chased the banks upon privatization in  1991-92  had financed the aggregate 
$12 billion price through substantial amounts of borrowing. Interest due had 
to be paid through current bank income, and this led the banks into taking 
increased credit risk through on-balance-sheet expansions and increased mar- 
ket risk through off-balance-sheet growth. 
Tesobono Swaps 
Industry sources in Mexico report that there was a stock of about $16 billion 
of Tesobono swaps at the time of the devaluation.16  Of the $29 billion of Teso- 
bonos outstanding on  19 December 1994, about $16.1 billion were held by 
16. Such numbers are guesswork because no one aggregates such data. Nevertheless, similar 
estimates were given to me by market managers at the top two banks in Mexico, which did a large 
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foreign addresses. Thus sufficient Tesobono swaps existed to repackage the 
entire foreign holding of Tesobono risk: foreigners held Tesobonos primarily 
to hedge Tesobono swaps and Mexican banks held the Tesobono risk. 
When the crisis arrived, Tesobono market values in dollars suddenly fell. 
From December 1994 to January 1995, Tesobono yields jumped from 8 to 24 
percent, and several of  the interim offerings failed. The fall in market value 
reduced the value of the collateral and triggered margin calls to deliver dollars 
or close out the positions. 
If the typical Tesobono fell by 15 percent in dollar value, the value of the col- 
lateral in the Tesobono swap of the earlier example would have fallen signifi- 
cantly; and a margin call would immediately have been sent to the Mexican 
bank. Alternatively, anticipating margin calls, the Mexican bank would imme- 
diately have sought dollar liquidity in preparation. To restore margin, the $16 
billion in swaps would instantly generate $16 X .15 = $2.4 billion of demand 
for dollars by the Mexican banks. 
Equity Swaps 
Market participants have characterized the market in offshore Mexican eq- 
uity swaps as very large, but they were not as explicit about orders of magni- 
tude as in the case of Tesobonos, though several have claimed that up to $3 
billion notional value of such contracts existed at the time of the crisis. 
With the collapse of  the peso, the stock market fell immediately by  about 
50 percent in dollars and by 66 percent within two months. With the margin in 
the equity swaps more than wiped out, margin calls or anticipations of margin 
calls again forced the Mexican banks to rush for dollar liquidity. Taking $3 
billion as the notional value of outstanding equity swaps, this would have re- 
quired the banks to find an additional $1.5 billion at the time of the 19 Decem- 
ber 1994 devaluation. Mexican institutions and individuals engaged in these 
swaps had to sell pesos to get margin or close out their positions, adding to the 
turmoil of the exchange and stock markets. 
The total of margin calls from Tesobono and equity swaps alone was about 
$4 billion. Coincidentally, this was approximately the amount by  which the 
Banco de Mexico’s reserves fell in the final attack just before the peso was al- 
lowed to float on 21 December 1994.’’ 
Structured Notes 
During  1994, Mexican financial institutions took large positions in struc- 
tured notes with investment houses in New York.’* Because the notes were 
reported by the banks as dollar assets, however, the accounting rules in Mexico 
allowed them to be booked as dollar positions, so that they were not counted 
17. In addition, other Mexico-oriented derivative products, such as Cetes swaps and Brady bond 
18. Most major New York financial engineering firms sold such products-e.g.,  Bankers Trust, 
swaps, also would have drawn margin calls at the same moment. 
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against the regulatory net currency position limit of a maximum of 15 percent 
of capital. 
The first group of these structures were known as Ajustabono structures and 
were first noticed when consolidated regulation was implemented in September 
1994.  The second group were similar to the structured note discussed earlier and 
came to the attention of authorities just after the December 1994 devaluation. 
Ajustabonos are inflation-indexed Mexican government securities that had 
long been held by Mexican banks. In addition to paying a relatively fixed real 
interest return, Ajustabonos could be counted as foreign exchange assets in 
determining regulatory foreign exchange positions, so Mexican banks funded 
their Ajustabono positions with dollar borrowings. When real interest rates 
rose in 1992, Mexican banks found that their Ajustabono positions were frozen 
because they did not want to realize the capital losses on their investment port- 
folios. The solution was to contract structures with New York banks and invest- 
ment houses through which the Ajustabonos could be used as collateral. 
For example, a U.S.  and a Mexican securities firm  associated with a bank 
would jointly organize a company in the Caymans or in Bermuda that would 
agree to purchase Ajustabonos at face value, with the funding obtained from 
the sale of two series of securities, one senior and one junior, both denominated 
in dollars. Suppose that the deal involved a Mexican bank’s  selling $120 mil- 
lion par value worth  of Ajustabonos to the company. The Mexican partner 
might put up $20 million and receive $20 million par value of the junior secur- 
ities, which it would sell to the Mexican bank. Denominated in dollars, the 
junior notes could be counted as a foreign exchange asset in determining regu- 
latory positions. The U.S. firm would invest $100 million and receive $100 
million par value of the senior securities. The senior securities would be de- 
signed to pay  a relatively secure dollar yield, which could be paid if  the ex- 
change rate did not depreciate excessively, and would be sold for LIBOR plus. 
The payoff  on the junior securities was like that of  a structured note-if  the 
exchange rate did not depreciate, it would pay a high yield and make good the 
losses on the Ajustabonos. If the exchange rate depreciated, the yield or princi- 
pal of the junior note would decline according to a predetermined formula. 
When the banking authorities became aware that the return on the junior 
notes was correlated with the peso, they required that 100 percent of the notes 
be covered with foreign exchange. Market sources estimate that $2 billion of 
the junior notes were outstanding in 1994. The banks began to cover their posi- 
tions in September 1994 and throughout the autumn, which contributed sig- 
nificantly to the drain on official reserves in the several months just prior to 
the devaluation. 
The Banco de Mexico found out after the devaluation that the more general 
structured notes like that of the “bullish obligation” example existed in large 
amounts. Charged with enforcing the regulation on net foreign exchange posi- 
tions of  the banks, the Banco de Mexico immediately ordered the banks to 
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dollars of foreign exchange during the postcollapse floating period, leading to 
the highly volatile and illiquid foreign exchange market that dominated the 
first quarter of  1995. 
Thus, taken in sequence, the Ajustabono structures, swaps, and structured 
notes account for most of the currency market dynamics in the months sur- 
rounding the collapse of the peso. The Mexican peso crisis is an example of 
a systemic crisis whose dynamics were driven by  a structure of outstanding 
derivatives. The timing and magnitude of the near-in reserve drain, the final at- 
tack on foreign exchange reserves, and the postcollapse market turbulence are 
explainable by  the automatic credit and market risk-covering programs at- 
tached to the contracts by counterparties and regulators themselves. 
What Does “Proper Public Debt Management” 
Mean in the Presence of Derivatives? 
Because Mexico had issued large amounts of  short-term Tesobonos that 
could not be rolled over in the aftermath of the devaluation, subsequent analy- 
ses have pinpointed improper public debt management as a major cause of the 
crisis (see, e.g., Calvo 1996; Calvo and Mendoza 1996; Cole and Kehoe 1996). 
The consequent policy prescription has been to restructure the public debt to 
longer maturities in a modern version of the nineteenth-century British pre- 
scription for virtuous public debt management: “all consols-no  bills.” 
The example of the Tesobono swaps, however, indicates that such a prescrip- 
tion can easily be circumvented. Even in the case of the relatively short term 
Tesobonos, the yield apparently was not sufficient to encourage foreign lenders 
to hold Mexico risk. Only the income-hungry Mexican banks wanted to hold 
the risk and were willing to accept the yields on Tesobonos that were unaccept- 
able to foreign lenders. Thus, vis-his the rest of the world, the Mexican na- 
tional balance sheet was a borrower of callable dollars through the Tesobono- 
Tesobono swap operation. The Tesobono debt of the government was balanced 
by the Tesobono return claims of the Mexican banks, leaving on net only the 
dollar debt. The sudden calls on the Mexican banking system to deliver dollars 
to restore margin effectively converted the average maturity of the Tesobonos 
from six months to callable, and the only way to satisfy the call was to deliver 
official reserves. 
Suppose that instead of the Tesobono issues, the Mexican government had 
structured its debt by issuing ten-year peso- or even dollar-denominated bonds. 
Foreign buyers, even more reluctant to absorb these issues than to absorb Teso- 
bonos, would have required very high yields. Mexican banks, however, proved 
that they would have been willing to take the risk at lower yields than foreign- 
ers. The Mexican government, therefore, would have found a market for the 
longer term debt as follows. Mexican banks would have entered into total re- 
turn swaps with foreign banks to receive the yield on the long-term debt and 
pay  dollar LIBOR, delivering collateral to the foreign banks. Foreign banks 
would then have been willing to buy the long-term debt. Any decline in value 404  Peter M. Garber 
of  the long-term debt would have  instantly triggered margin calls to deliver 
dollars. Effectively, these operations would have converted these long-term 
claims against the Mexican government into short-term, perhaps callable dol- 
lar claims against the national balance sheet. 
If the foreign lenders’ view of the risks is that they warrant only short-term 
lending, a prescription to lengthen the debt is an irrelevancy. Even if it is under- 
taken on balance sheet, it will be undone off balance sheet. 
Of course, if the government has made a strong commitment not to bail out 
the banking system, the construction of a national balance sheet is irrelevant; 
Tesobono risk or the risk of government securities with any particular features 
would then be priced properly by the domestic banks, and their dollar margin 
requirements would not be met by the central bank. The public debt could then 
be truly lengthened, if  that is desirable. 
7.2.6  Effects of Derivatives on the Interpretation 
of Balance-of-Payments  Accounting 
Among the rationales for balance-of-payments  accounting is to ascertain the 
stability of capital flows of on-balance-sheet movements of assets. Typically, 
balance-of-payments accounting data are used to measure how long capital 
will remain in a country-to  distinguish “good” money from “hot” money.I9 
Various categories of the capital accounts have been interpreted as indicative 
of the nature of capital inflows or outflows. Foreign direct investment, for ex- 
ample, has been considered a more stable form of  investment than portfolio 
investment or the foreign acquisition of bank claims. Foreign acquisition of 
short-term fixed interest products is generally regarded as a speculative flow. 
Balance-of-payments accounts are also used to measure the foreign exchange 
position of a country’s consolidated balance and, in times of  crisis, to deter- 
mine the potential outflow of foreign exchange through speculation or covering 
operations by holders of domestic liquid assets. 
The revolution in global finance and notably the explosion in the use of 
derivative products have rendered the use of  balance-of-payments capital ac- 
count data even more problematic than it has been in the past.*O Balance-of- 
payments accounting data use on-balance-sheet categorizations, and they are 
19. Although balance-of-payments capital accounts are set up to measure cross-border changes 
in legal ownership of claims to assets and liabilities, the classification system for financial items 
is designed to bring out the motivation of  creditors and debtors. See IMF (1994, xxii). 
20. The usual problems concern omissions or miscategorizations of  transactions. That these 
have been magnified in the presence of widespread use of derivatives has been duly recognized by 
authorities responsible for technical standards, as exemplified by the April 1996 meeting at the 
IMF of the Informal Group on Financial Derivatives. Nevertheless, technical discussions even now 
center on how to fit derivative-generated payments into standard categories such as interest vs. 
capital gains, the treatment of margin flows, and how to book repurchase agreements. The un- 
dermining of the meaning of the various asset categories of  the capital accounts in the presence of 
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based on value accounting principles to book and categorize asset values. They 
ignore almost completely the existence of derivatives and their role in reallo- 
cating who bears market risk. This would not be a problem of  a magnitude 
greater than the normal caveats on balance-of-payments  accounting data except 
that there has been an explosion in the use of derivative products and especially 
in the use of cross-border products. 
For example, the acquisition of a large block of equity is classified as foreign 
direct investment, but a foreign buyer may be acquiring the block simply to 
hedge a short position in equity established through a derivative position. In 
the case of the equity swap described above, the foreign investment firm that 
sells the swap must acquire the shares to form a hedge. If  the swap is large 
enough, the hedging operation may  be booked as foreign direct investment 
because the offshore swap position is not included in the capital accounts, al- 
though the investment house in fact is making a short-term floating rate loan 
in foreign currency. 
Declines in equity values or the exchange rate will then generate instanta- 
neous exchange market pressure as margin calls are made or positions are 
closed. This is contrary to the general view among central banks that stock 
market investment will not likely generate exchange market pressure in a crisis 
because the losses will already have been absorbed in a resultant crash. Stock 
market money is therefore regarded as less hot. If the buyer of  the swap is a 
domestic resident, the capital import effectively takes the form of short-term 
foreign-currency-denominated borrowing, but the leveraged equity risk, and 
even the long-term control, remains in the hands of the domestic resident. Thus 
the “direct investment” turns into the hottest of  money. In a similar manner, 
direct investment in the form of reinvestment of profits can be converted into 
short-term funding through an equity swap. 
Alternatively, a foreign program trader may acquire the domestic stock index 
in the cash market while selling forward in the offshore OTC index market. On 
net, he has a zero position in equities but in the balance-of-payments accounts 
appears as a portfolio investor in domestic equities. If  the opposite positions 
are taken by  domestic residents-a  sale of equities in the cash market and a 
forward purchase in the derivative market-the  net equity risk position for 
domestic residents is unchanged, though domestic residents are now in effect 
short-term foreign currency borrowers. 
To  the extent that they start with zero replacement values as in the case of 
swaps and forwards, derivative products do not affect measured net  capital 
inflows or outflows, but they blur the information in subcategories of the capi- 
tal accounts.21  Specifically, they make a mockery of the use of capital account 
categories to attempt to measure the aggregate short foreign currency position 
of an economy. 
21. An exception arises if a deposit of  margin is required by a foreign counterparty; the margin 
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7.2.7  Conclusion 
From the explosion in the use of  derivative products has emerged a blind 
spot in both national and international  surveillance of capital markets. Through 
derivatives both individual institutions and financial systems can be put at risk 
in magnitudes and from directions completely unknown to regulators. This 
problem arises because derivatives are ideal means of avoiding prudential regu- 
lations, given the universally slow adjustment of accounting principles to the 
advent of these products. On a more parochial level, the accounting principles 
on which the balance-of-payments data-gathering exercise is based are being 
made increasingly obsolete. For each country, the  extent of the problem is un- 
known because comprehensive data on derivatives are gathered only at long 
intervals, and even the triennial BIS data are not broken down into those rele- 
vant for emerging market countries. 
The optical illusion created by viewing the flow of capital only through the 
on-balance-sheet lens creates a dangerous potential for misinterpreting the im- 
plications of major events in capital markets. The information conveyed by the 
balance-of-payments accounts on the riskiness of the national balance sheet is 
confounded, so the susceptibility of an economy to capital flow reversals can- 
not be known. When capital flows suddenly reverse, it is difficult to know 
which players are driving the flows and therefore to determine the appropriate 
short- and long-term policy response. 
This paper has provided several examples to illustrate how readily the exis- 
tence of derivative products can change the meaning of capital flow data, how 
the derivatives may  automatically generate liquidity demands in response to 
triggering events in financial markets, and how easy it is to attribute such re- 
sponses to structural flaws elsewhere in the financial system. 
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3. Andrew Crockett 
I will not rehearse at any great length in these remarks the advantages of inter- 
national capital flows. They are obvious and they have already been discussed. 
Capital flows give countries with development potential access to foreign sav- 
ings. They ensure the more efficient use of domestic savings because invest- 
ment has to yield returns that are up to international standards. They discipline 
economic policy. And, last but not least, they help to share and diversify risks. 
Risk is an inevitable part of all economic activity. An  autarkic approach, in 
which each country would bear all of the risks of its own domestic investment 
choices, would clearly be inefficient. Therefore, allowing foreign investors to 
assume some of the risks of domestic investment, and allowing domestic inves- 
tors to take profits from risk bearing abroad, helps improve welfare. 
But while we all recognize these benefits and have indeed discussed them in 
the course of this conference, the fact is that recent experience is not particu- 
larly comforting. Consider events going back no further than, say, the 1970s. 
The lending boom to Latin America was followed by the debt crisis that started 
in 1982 and led to the “lost decade” for economic growth. More recently we 
had the Mexican crisis of  1994-95,  and now we have the Asian crisis. These 
are all episodes in which the initial advantages of capital flows, which I think 
were real, were followed by very painful retrenchments, which cost a lot to the 
countries and the investors in the countries. They cost a lot, in some cases, to 
the lenders, too. 
Typically, these episodes have had three distinct phases. In the first, inflows 
of  capital have built up, lasted for a number of  years, and often become very 408  Andrew Crockett 
large. Economic liberalization and reform have usually acted as the initial spur 
to inflows. That was the case both in Latin America and in Asia. And in the 
general pattern, when these inflows begin and gather strength, the authorities 
resist currency appreciation, for understandable reasons, and accumulate re- 
serves. Such a policy has the advantage of maintaining competitiveness better 
than it would otherwise be, but it also has drawbacks. 
The first drawback is the cost of intervention. The interest paid on domestic 
currency liabilities is typically higher than that received on reserve assets, 
sometimes much higher. This is the so-called quasi-fiscal cost. The second 
drawback is that intervention can often lead to excessive domestic liquidity. 
Sterilization is generally not wholly effective, certainly not over prolonged pe- 
riods of time. In Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, and other countries intervention 
has contributed, directly or indirectly, to rapid expansion of  domestic bank 
credit. A third drawback is that inflows may be too great, in such a short period 
of time, to be absorbed effectively in efficient, productive activities. They go 
either directly or indirectly to finance consumption-that  has been the case in 
a number of Latin American countries-or  they go into relatively low return 
infrastructure investment, which has been the case in certain Asian countries. 
In the second phase of capital inflows, the tide begins to turn. Current ac- 
count deficits widen, partly as a result of inflationary pressures driving up do- 
mestic costs and partly reflecting higher investment in infrastructure. At the 
beginning of  this phase, authorities are not particularly worried. They may 
even be rather glad that the upward pressure on the currency is beginning to 
subside, and they may be happy to see some rundown of what they consider to 
be excessive reserves. Often the markets are not particularly worried in that 
initial turning phase either. 
But then we come to the third phase of  the three-phase process, which is 
when a crisis breaks out. At some point, the boom fades. It may be because 
exports or investment weaken, either from high rates to slightly lower rates, or 
from lower rates their growth may cease. It may be accompanied at some stage 
by a political trigger, but whatever it is, markets lose confidence, and there is 
a stampede for the exits. Countries that before had easy access to international 
capital markets at reasonable rates suddenly find they cannot raise capital at 
any price. The consequences of that can be, and have been, severe. The reduc- 
tion in output below the trend level in Argentina and Mexico, for example, was 
probably in the region of 10 to 15 percent in the first year. A loss of confidence 
introduces very large risk premiums into interest rates and so strains the bank- 
ing system of the countries concerned. Exchange rate adjustments may over- 
shoot, raising the risk of inflation and increasing the debt service burden. 
What I want to emphasize about this process is that the international finan- 
cial markets have not exercised a progressive discipline, whereby a gradual 
increase in borrowing costs leads to progressively tighter constraints on the 
behavior of economic agents. What has happened is a discontinuity; a poten- 
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not been factored into pricing and then has been recognized only when it is 
too late. 
What should the reaction be to this three-stage development? Some, like 
Prime Minister Mahathir, have called for more restrictions on capital flows. I 
presume everybody at this conference would feel that is neither a desirable, 
nor indeed a feasible, response to the situation. We need to think more carefully 
about risk. The existing process has three important shortcomings that need to 
be addressed. They happen all to begin with “P.” 
One is perception: markets and others need to grasp the true dimensions of 
risk better than they do now. One is pricing: risks need to be properly priced. 
One is precautions: lenders and borrowers need to take measures both to re- 
duce the risks of a crisis and to limit the damage when things go wrong. 
Let me start with perception. Several factors can lead to inappropriate or 
inaccurate perceptions of the true risks involved in international capital flows. 
One is that markets underestimate the scale and duration of potential shocks, 
as well as the potential for destabilizing dynamics. 
Nearly always, when economic agents are asked to think of where things 
could go wrong, they cite changes in financial market situations that are much 
smaller than can actually occur. If you spoke to observers of the Mexican econ- 
omy in the pre-1994 period, even among the minority who were prepared to 
accept that something might go wrong a 10 or 15 percent depreciation of the 
currency was seen as the likely magnitude of  a possible shock. Similarly in 
Asia, no one imagined the scale of  the financial meltdown in the economies 
concerned. 
So I think there is an unwillingness on the part of markets to contemplate 
the potential scale of a disruption they might subsequently face. It is also not 
fully appreciated how destabilizing dynamics can accentuate market reactions 
when it is the private sector that holds foreign currency debt. Once expecta- 
tions change, for example, when those with dollar debt suddenly seek to hedge 
their positions, this can add enormously to the downward pressure on the ex- 
change rate. That has been important in Indonesia, Thailand, and some other 
cases. 
Moreover, it is often underestimated how much time it takes to reestablish 
confidence, and therefore extreme values of  interest rates or exchange rates 
can persist for longer than is anticipated by market agents. 
A second perception problem is that the nature of risks can change in the 
course of a crisis. For example, lenders may believe they are protected against 
interest risk or currency risk because loans are short term or denominated in 
foreign currency. They may not appreciate that extreme movements in interest 
rates and exchange rates can convert what was formerly an adequate credit risk 
into a poor credit risk. So the protections that are normally put in place to 
match interest rate or currency exposure may simply end up converting a mar- 
ket rate risk into a credit risk. 
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country to another. When conditions are calm policymakers in individual coun- 
tries usually do not take enough account of  how  difficulties in a similarly 
placed country can affect them. However, markets that may seem to be loosely 
correlated in normal times can become much more closely correlated in a cri- 
sis. This needs to be borne in mind in assessing how effectively risks are diver- 
sified, in practice. 
Another aspect is that external events outside the control of the country can 
create major common problems. For instance, if the shock is a change in the 
U.S. interest rate regime, then countries that consider themselves to be in dis- 
tinct situations may  find that they are similarly affected by  developments in 
U.S. monetary policy. 
Summing up, my point is that the first essential step is to make sure that the 
nature of risks is better assessed and perceived than it is at the moment. 
Let me now pass on to the pricing of  risk. Risk premiums do not appear to 
reflect greater risks even as a crisis approaches, but then they often overreact 
once the crisis strikes. Why don’t they respond earlier? This is not an easy 
question to answer. A naive observer might expect that the greater depth and 
range of  markets that exist nowadays would make risks more quantifiable, 
more tractable, and better priced than they were before. But for a number of 
reasons, markets are not pricing risks adequately in precrisis periods. 
One such reason may be a variant of liquidity illusion. Individual investors 
believe that they can get out quickly, with only small losses. But in the aggre- 
gate, of  course, they cannot. Paradoxically, the existence of  hedging instru- 
ments may  have  encouraged firms to adopt riskier strategies, for example, 
through foreign currency borrowing, because they believe that they can hedge 
themselves effectively if a crisis appears imminent. A second element is the 
very familiar moral hazard question. There may  be a greater expectation in 
markets that the authorities will somehow do “something” to prevent or cush- 
ion adverse developments. It is often not very clear in the minds of  market 
participants exactly what that something is, but if there is such an expectation, 
the risks are seen as being less than they would be in the absence of expecta- 
tions of official support. 
I am sympathetic to the idea of a discontinuous regime shift of the kind that 
is referred to in Paul Krugman’s paper (chap. 8.1). A situation that, up  to a 
certain point, appears sustainable, and therefore attracts equilibrating behavior 
on the part of market agents, can, as a result of a relatively small change in the 
perception of the situation, result in behavior that tends to destabilize and bring 
about the crisis. 
Last, it is worth mentioning an issue that is raised by  Peter Garber (chap. 
7.2):  Does the greater range of derivative instruments help the unscrupulous to 
hide and disguise risks? It certainly could. There is a problem of opacity here, 
and the need to develop ways of enhancing effective disclosure, disclosure that 
really enables those who are observing the situation to gauge the risks that are 
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Let me now come to the precautions that lenders and borrowers, in particu- 
lar borrowers, can take to improve or to effectively contain the risks that are in- 
volved. 
One is obviously prudent monetary policy. Crises are often preceded by ear- 
lier periods of monetary slackness. The precise signs vary. Sometimes it is too 
rapid expansion of bank credit, sometimes asset price bubbles, and sometimes 
a  high level of  dollar-denominated borrowing with a  fixed exchange rate, 
which makes people think interest rates are low. It has been said at this confer- 
ence that anything that grows at 15 percent (I think this was the figure used) is 
growing too fast. Whatever the precise figure, we have been naive in the past 
in looking at rapid rates of growth of variables that cannot grow indefinitely 
beyond the rate of the underlying economy and accepted for too long that they 
are sustainable. Then what happens is that there is a reluctance to tighten pol- 
icy in a preemptive way when danger signals mount. Sometimes that is because 
of  a commitment to the exchange rate, and the difficulties of getting out of 
such a commitment. But all of  that unwillingness to react earlier makes the 
eventual crisis worse because the excesses accumulate longer. 
I believe Lawrence Summers once said that a prudent response would be 
react to all adverse shocks as though they were permanent, and all positive 
shocks as though they were transitory. I am afraid that too often it has been the 
reverse, and the adjustment has not begun despite the mounting danger signals. 
The second element of precautions has to be in the strengthening of financial 
systems, especially the banking system. Virtually all recent crises have been 
made worse by weak and overextended banking systems. In the end, the gov- 
ernment typically pays for these mistakes. So there is a need to strengthen 
banking systems. The core principles of the Basle Committee have been men- 
tioned. That is a start, but it is only a start. Mervyn King has reminded us why 
one needs to look beyond just the banking system, and beyond just banking 
supervision, in order to strengthen financial structures.  Are enough precautions 
being taken to deal with worst-case scenarios? I doubt it, in many cases. Take 
loan-to-value ratios as an example. I have often been told by  supervisors and 
monetary authorities: it’s fine, we’ve enforced a loan-to-value ratio of 70 per- 
cent. Well, if the exchange rate falls by  30 percent and real estate falls by 20 
percent, you’ve eaten up the 30 percent margin, very, very quickly. 
Deeper and longer term financial markets are another important building 
block for a more robust system. An intrinsic problem in many emerging mar- 
kets is that they are thin. They are also very short term. In Asia, long-term 
bond markets are not very developed. This can leave borrowers exposed to 
shifts in  sentiment. But  the development of  large domestic pension funds 
should, over time, help to foster deeper and longer term financial markets. 
Government must also avoid creating distortions that prevent the market 
from pricing risk properly. We have the example of the Tesobonos in Mexico, 
and the futures obligations in Thailand. In both cases, the market is demanding 
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by issuing short-term dollar-denominated paper, or by forward sales of foreign 
currency, and so on. In both cases, the risk is not effectively coming through 
to influence private sector lender and borrower behavior. 
There needs to be an increased ability for the market to become aware of 
risks at an earlier stage. We have talked about the importance of the publication 
of key indicators. I realize that indicators alone are not going to be sufficient. 
I do think, however, that better information is needed and that in certain cases 
it would have been easier for market participants to become aware of the risks 
that were growing if the data had been adequately available. 
But more is still needed. I would cite two dimensions on which we might 
think about strengthening risk awareness. One is through a more effective use 
of credit rating agencies. Obviously it is not possible to tell credit rating agen- 
cies what to do, but I think they have often been too unwilling to adjust their 
ratings downward when danger has threatened. For example, the Japanese 
banks were nearly all AAA, right up until 1989. In hindsight, it seems clear 
that there were enough danger signals by  1989 that it would have been prudent 
to have done at least a modest downgrade before then. 
Second is the question of  whether official surveillance should somehow 
draw attention, more than it has done, to growing dangers. This is an issue that 
has come up in a number of forums. I would be interested in Stanley Fischer’s 
comments on this in connection with the Thai crisis, where a number of official 
agencies saw the difficulties in advance. We did at the BIS, and so did the IMF. 
And I am sure we both said so to the Thai authorities. How much beyond that 
can you go? Is it possible to draw attention to unsustainable situations as they 
develop? I don’t have a clear answer to that. Obviously it is not the answer to 
make a public speech that Thailand is about to face a crisis. But whether there 
is some intermediate response in which greater attention can be drawn at an 
early enough stage that a crisis is not likely to break out in a major way  is I 
think an issue that deserves consideration. 
I want to conclude by saying that we mustn’t forget that one source of uncer- 
tainty for markets is whether effective official action to deal with a crisis will 
be taken. By that I mean that markets are uncertain about how strong the com- 
mitment of government is, both the political will and the economic understand- 
ing, to undertake necessary and timely measures to correct an unsustainable 
situation. In many episodes a loss of confidence in the government’s ability to 
take decisive action, rather than just the underlying macroeconomic situation, 
has either initiated or prolonged the crisis. 
There is also the question of international support. Much quicker IMF action 
is now available, supported of course by conditionality.  The international finan- 
cial community has to avoid creating an impression that the Seventh Cavalry 
will come to the rescue automatically. There is an important advantage to what 
I might have called “constructive ambiguity,” if that term hadn’t been criticized 
earlier. There is also much to be said for making it clear that, while the interna- 
tional community is there, it is there only under strict conditionality terms. 
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kets that liquidity will be made available, either through national authorities, 
through the market itself, or through the international community, too easily, 
then we  are not doing enough to make market agents internalize the risks. 
The objective must be to internalize the risks by  the various measures I have 
talked about. 
4. David W Mullins, Jr: 
I would like to explore some views and concerns surrounding  the recent Asian 
crisis. This will also reinforce a number of points raised by others. 
First, the generic setting, as I understand it. On the demand side, countries 
want to grow. They know how to grow. For the first time in seventy-five years, 
there is very little debate over the type of economic system that encourages 
growth. To grow requires capital, typically in excess of domestic savings, even 
in high-savings areas such as Asia. Some of the capital can take the form of 
foreign direct investment, but there are limits, including political limits. So 
high-growth countries typically rely to some not insignificant extent on portfo- 
lio investment. This is essentially the demand side of the equation. 
The supply side is driven by deeply entrenched trends. The aging popula- 
tions of developed nations produce large pools of  savings in search of high 
returns. The mathematics and economics of international portfolio diversifica- 
tion produce benefits that are irrefutable, and ultimately irresistible. These are 
some of the factors driving the supply side of the market. 
Supply and demand are brought together by markets. Of course in the past it 
was more likely financial institutions intermediating  capital flows to emerging 
markets. Why have markets increasingly replaced direct lending by  financial 
institutions?  Driven by advances in technology, the flexibility,  relative liquidity, 
and efficiency of markets have proved competitively superior to the older style 
financial system of direct investment by banks. There are even those who argue 
that market discipline is superior to direct lender discipline, pointing to the 
relatively quick recovery of  Latin America from the market crisis in  1995, 
compared to the lost decade of development of the 1980s following the bank 
debt problems in Latin America. I thmk this comparison omits many factors. 
Still, the evolving market system has generally supported strong growth in 
countries, while providing investors diversification and attractive risk-adjusted 
returns. So what’s the problem? 
It has been suggested that, while markets generally work very well, they 
don’t work perfectly. In particular, some have suggested that markets may be 
subject to imperfections, periods of instability that can damage the real econ- 
omy. Some have suggested that markets in highly developed economies might 
get out of line every now and then. I would suggest there is enough concern 
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markets, it has been suggested that market discipline is highly imperfect, at 
times too lenient or too harsh; discipline is not well calibrated to the nature of 
the offense; and indeed, with contagion, harsh discipline is applied to the in- 
nocent. 
A word about why contagion exists. Obviously one reason is redemptions 
by  fund investors and the like. A more fundamental reason, though, is that 
contagion comes in part from sound risk management principles. An investor 
specializing in emerging markets who loses money in one country incurs a 
reduction in net worth and must reduce risk accordingly, by scaling back posi- 
tions in other markets. This is in part what we call a behavioral correlation 
among countries that may  have  no fundamental economic linkages. This is 
simply a reality of the current market system. 
Back to the issue of market dysfunction. One depiction of these emerging 
market crises starts with a period of what I would call “market forbearance,” 
analogous to the manner in which banking regulators and bank lenders forbear. 
Investors, ignoring a country’s problems, continue to invest, pushing prices 
higher, enjoying good returns. Why do they do this? 
First, though aware of problems, professional investors may feel they must 
continue to invest and earn returns to keep up with competitors who are do- 
ing the same. Second, investors feel they are nimble enough to escape before 
the inevitable correction. And of course, typically following some triggering 
event, a change in government policy, currency regime, actions of some partic- 
ularly aggressive market participants, or exodus by  locals, when investors at- 
tempt to execute their escape in unison, the result is market overshooting, fall- 
ing beyond the level seemingly warranted by fundamentals. 
Lower  market  prices  themselves produce  economic  damage, justifying 
lower prices, and this is the concern with overshooting. It is not benign, simply 
bouncing back. The concern is that the overshooting itself may produce dam- 
age and cause firms to go bankrupt, producing interruptions in production, and 
similar hardships, that actually damage the real economy. This is one scenario 
of  market dysfunction. So even though markets generally work quite well, 
there is this concern of destabilizing market crises-runs-that  may damage 
real economies, inflicting unwarranted pain and hardship. Accepting this possi- 
bility, what’s the solution? 
A number of government officials have argued, at least in private, that there 
is a very straightforward solution. They have argued an analogy with the earlier 
financial system, the banking system. That system too was subject to imperfec- 
tions in the form of  destabilizing bank runs that damaged the real economy. 
We  found a solution to that imperfection. It began as the central bank as the 
lender of  last resort, transmuted into deposit insurance, and evolved into the 
federal safety net for banking institutions. In the United States, following the 
banking collapse of the Great Depression, this solution produced a long period 
of financial stability, culminating in the not too destabilizing but very costly 
savings and loan and banking failures of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Aca- 
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eral safety net. However, despite costly episodes of  moral hazard, virtually 
every country relies on the federal safety net to combat the potential economic 
damage of destabilizing bank failures. In the period of the late 1980s during 
the savings and loan workout, and in the early 1990s when our banking system 
was weak, we were paying the wages of sin, the wages of moral hazard. None- 
theless, our colleagues in other countries were asking for technical help on 
how they too could develop a deposit insurance system, including in European 
countries. So this solution is fairly well established. Why not do the same to 
combat capital market instability? If governments can keep banks from failing, 
why shouldn’t governments keep markets from falling, or at least from falling 
so fast or so far as to cause economic damage? 
In my view, a government safety net is not likely to be an effed8.e antidote 
to market instability. Compared to bank rescues, the direct cost ofmarket res- 
cues is likely to be much greater, and the probability of success much smaller. 
One instructive episode was the cost and outcome of the Europeans’ attempt 
to sustain the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, not an encouraging example. 
It is one thing to bail out one or a few banks, and quite another to confront the 
accumulated mass of a market. So in my view a government safety net market 
support system is neither a promising nor an appropriate solution to the prob- 
lem of  market instability. There seems to be a surprising degree of  support 
underneath the surface of public debate for such a solution-support  not only 
among some public officials but among investors. Similar attitudes were ex- 
pressed following the Mexican problem in 1995 and after the 1987 stock mar- 
ket crash. 
I will confess that our  case against the government safety net would be 
stronger if  we could offer a convincingly fail-safe alternative. As of  yet  we 
have none. In my view, we are still in the early stages of our experience with 
these episodes. We  are learning, and making progress,  and 1 shall review 
briefly some prescriptions that seem promising. 
Among the remedies that have been suggested are the standard bromides. 
Indeed, around the time of the World Bank meetings, the FinanciaE Emes came 
out with an extensive supplement, giving its solution. One might characterize 
its solution to these problems as the stricture that governments should not make 
mistakes in managing their economies. I consider this a profound observation. 
It is certainly true that there are lessons on economic policy to be drawn from 
the recent crises. We have learned that contagion is a reality, and it is important 
that countries be aware of their neighbor’s policies. This argues for regional 
consultation. 
But I know from working in government that, under political pressures and 
economic shocks, mistakes will be made. All governments and countries are 
likely, if not destined, to experience some episodes of bad policy, bad manage- 
ment, and plain bad luck. So it would be useful to have an approach to market 
instability likely to be robust in the face of some of these possibilities. 
The second preventative that has been discussed in detail here is increased 
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hearty two cheers for transparency, reserving the third cheer for an occasional 
application of opaqueness. I believe, though, that in recent episodes of market 
instability, the root cause was not that investors were unaware of the underlying 
problems. It is true that after the fact we can always specify the one critical 
variable, if we had only known. Let’s specify these ahead of time. 
While helpful, I am not overly optimistic that transparency alone will do 
the job, eliminating overshooting behavior. I should also mention that some 
countries argue the utility of limited capital controls that govern the inflow of 
portfolio investment. I am skeptical that capital controls will be found an effec- 
tive and efficient mechanism, both to promote growth and inhibit market insta- 
bility, although a number of countries seem to have performed pretty well with 
these conkmls. Those of us who oppose capital controls have a burden to ex- 
plain more persuasively their disadvantages. There is growing support for lim- 
ited controls, given the fact that a number of countries, for extended periods 
of time, seem to have done reasonably well. For a government safety net and 
limited capital control there is a surprising degree of  support. It may be that 
just any approaches so universally opposed by economists can’t be all bad. 
There are several approaches that in my opinion would be useful. As others 
have noted, it would be useful for countries that depend on portfolio capital 
investment to focus on strengthening not only their financial policies, their 
currency regimes, but also their financial systems. Sound banking systems are 
especially important. This has been also explored by others, so I will not dwell 
on it. 
Moreover, I believe countries dependent on portfolio capital investment 
should work to develop their capital markets. They need to erect the appro- 
priate capital market infrastructure, to expand the diversity of investment vehi- 
cles including longer term investment markets as well. It is also useful for such 
countries to develop appropriate derivative markets, providing hedging and 
risk management vehicles. Such vehicles tend to weigh against mispricing, 
provide useful hedging opportunities for local institutions and firms, and tend 
to broaden the investor base, to attract investors who require such vehicles to 
manage risk. Derivatives also price risk and make risk more transparent. Deriv- 
atives clearly reduce the cost of risk. They allow different risks to be separated 
and segmented, and traded around the financial system to those willing and 
able to bear each risk at minimum cost. This reduces the overall cost of risk 
bearing. Derivatives also facilitate diversification, and diversification reduces 
risk. It’s  not this year’s  Nobel prize, but the earlier one given to Sharpe and 
Markowitz. Derivatives play a role in making markets more complete. Cur- 
rently, in many emerging markets it is hard to get short, and this is one reason 
such markets may tend to get out of line. 
More generally along these lines, some of the solutions to these problems 
can be found in the markets. Countries should seek to broaden and deepen the 
base of  investors knowledgeable and confident in investing in their markets, 
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drawals. After all, there is an attractive business investing in difficult market 
conditions, supporting markets, and  seeking to profit when stability returns. 
The investors attracted to this strategy tend to have a longer term perspective 
and more stable sources of capital. I am suggesting that countries in effect 
work to recruit the other side of market disturbances, by  actively developing 
their capital markets. Relevant here are a number of points that Stephen Fried- 
man discussed (chap. 5.3), as well as Andrew Crockett’s discussion about de- 
veloping longer term markets (chap. 7.3). 
If a country depends on portfolio capital investment, developing the capital 
markets is as important as developing the real economy because it will facili- 
tate the development of  the real economy. Continuing on the investors’ per- 
spective, in my view we are still in the early stages of the development of this 
global market system. Countries will still want to grow rapidly. We  are cer- 
tainly in the early stages of international diversification of investment portfo- 
lios. The overwhelming proportion of portfolios are still invested at home. We 
have a lot to learn. 
This recent period of instability  occurred against a quite benign market envi- 
ronment in developed countries. Despite all the setbacks and volatility, inves- 
tors still view emerging markets as perhaps the most promising investment 
venue in the years ahead, unique opportunities in times of difficulty. Certainly 
those who invested in Mexico and Latin America in 1995 have done rather 
well. I recognize that region had  the good fortune of  close proximity to an 
impressive engine of growth, the U.S. economy, while the Asian region has a 
very  formidable economic competitor emerging in  the neighborhood in the 
form of China. 
Still, at a time when asset prices in developed markets seem rather high, 
searching for value in emerging economies, countries seeking to recover from 
difficulties, is a most promising activity for investors-one  that should be ac- 
tively encouraged. 
To  summarize, there are real risks, both to the countries and investors, from 
these sorts of market disturbances. With contagion, following sound policies 
provides no guarantee of  protection. Indeed, some countries in this crisis, 
which have  followed the advice of  enlightened economists, appear to have 
been hurt worse than other countries that have behaved badly. 
While we have no fail-safe remedies to offer to the problem of market distur- 
bances, I do not think the answer lies in retreating from the global market 
system, or in attempting to short-circuit markets with costly government pro- 
tection of questionable efficacy. A better defense, and a good offensive strategy 
as well, is for governments not only to pursue sound economic policies but to 
develop and strengthen their financial systems and capital markets. Still, this 
is pretty cold comfort to countries that have tried to follow such policies and 
now face very painful adjustments in the real economy. 418  Discussion Summary 
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Martin Feldstein noted that two central policy questions had emerged from 
this discussion. First, what should surveillance agencies say and do in response 
to perceived mispricings of risk? Second, what are the advantages and disad- 
vantages of capital controls in managing capital inflows? 
Peter Garber commented that the source of  the perceived mispricing of 
risks may be demand from domestic agents who are responding to the implicit 
protection afforded by  domestic regulators rather than euphoria. In response 
to this implicit protection, domestic agents use derivatives to “double” their 
bets as their situation worsens. Accordingly, Garber agreed with the neutrality 
of derivatives in and of themselves but suggested that any prescription for the 
increased use of  derivatives in developing markets is dangerous given these 
possibilities for the radical restructuring of risks and their associated opacity. 
Paul Krugman noted that in recent crises, bank lending has been rational ex 
post given the packages of support provided to lenders. However, the obvious 
mispricing has been in domestic currency assets, as in Thailand, where little 
attention was paid to the possibility of a crisis until the last moment. Regarding 
the “James Dean” theory of investing noted by David Mullins, Krugman char- 
acterized this as the “greater fool” theory. In this vein, he recalled that when 
he asked an MBA student to ask banks that lent to Latin America in the 1980s 
why they lent, the common response was “We’re lending short term so we’re 
going to get out fine.” 
Roberto Mendoza suggested that crises make risks look mispriced ex post. 
However, it is far from clear that these risks were mispriced ex ante. Indeed, 
Mendoza noted that any supposed mispricing has to be measured within the 
entire range of assets and correlations ex ante. Furthermore, he suggested that 
markets should remove these mispricings if they truly exist and are persistent. 
Mendoza also noted that the notion that private lending has been safe in recent 
crises is not accurate. For example, U.S. banks and firms have suffered losses 
in the Thai crisis either through delayed payment or failed guarantees. Finally, 
Mendoza agreed with Mullins’s characterization of derivatives as instruments 
that isolate and segment risks rather than increase systemic risks. 
Feldstein recharacterized the question about derivatives as whether at the 
time of a crisis they allow governments or private agents to take actions that 
deepen the crisis. Jeffrey Frankel noted that the actions of the Thai government 
in the forward markets correspond to that description. 
Garber acknowledged the advantages of derivatives in reallocating risk and 
making the price of risk more transparent. However, he noted that his emphasis 
was on private actors, such as local banks in over-the-counter markets, where 
their actions and net positions were made opaque as a result of using derivatives. 
Feldstein characterized this as a disagreement between the advantages of 
derivatives in making the prices of risk more transparent and the use of deriva- 
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MuZlins suggested that even over-the-counter positions require manufactur- 
ing. Accordingly, the use of derivatives will make such positions more trans- 
parent. 
Arminio Fraga suggested that the Mexican case may prove instructive for 
this question. He suggested that the absence of  creditworthy counterparties 
was a major obstacle to shorting the peso. Consequently, there was not enough 
liquidity to drive down the price of the peso to reasonable levels. In fact, the 
entry of foreign banks in Mexico since the 1994 crisis has created much needed 
liquidity in that market. As such, this example suggests that the depth of deriva- 
tive markets can mitigate potential crises. 
Feldstein returned to the question of how we can recognize mispricing of 
risks and asked Andrew Crockett whether the BIS or IMF had inside informa- 
tion that led them to believe that mispricing existed. 
Crockett responded that the BIS and IMF were concerned for a while about 
the Thai situation. Regarding the source of the mispricing, he suggested that 
many  factors-including  government interventions, informational symmet- 
ries, incentives, and price dynamics-can  give rise to the prices of risk being 
wrong. Understanding these imperfections, while very difficult, is central to 
sorting through these questions. Additionally, derivatives exploit linkages be- 
tween markets and therefore can magnify or spread these initial distortions and 
the associated mispricings. 
David Folkerts-Landau returned to the benefits of using temporary capital 
controls within a program of broader economic liberalization. He suggested a 
parallel between the use of  mandatory reserve requirements during extreme 
capital inflows and the use of limits on short positions or trading halts in devel- 
oped capital markets. Such analogues should allow us to be more comfortable 
with the idea of capital controls. 
Sebastian Edwards countered that while there may be an intellectual justifi- 
cation for temporary capital controls, this argument is very far from supporting 
the permanent fixture that such controls have evolved into in many Latin Amer- 
ican countries. Edwards also agreed with Mullins’s observation that the profes- 
sion hasn’t succeeded in making a convincing case that capital controls don’t 
work as permanent fixtures. Edwards noted that there is some evidence that 
countries such as Chile have succeeded in spite of the presence of capital con- 
trols rather than because of them. 
Red  Stulz emphasized that the expansion of derivative markets does face a 
natural limit in the need for counterparties that are sufficiently creditworthy. 
Additionally, he noted that a major benefit of derivatives had been overlooked. 
Derivatives allow firms to take additional production risks and thereby create 
additional value. Stulz also suggested that the questions of contagion and capi- 
tal controls are intimately related. If we believe in contagion, then a substantial 
case can be made for capital controls. Nonetheless, contagion is easy to see 
but very hard to prove. 
Tukatoshi Zto  concurred with Folkerts-Landau and suggested that there ex- 420  Discussion Summary 
ists a consensus that short-term capital inflows can be dangerous when accom- 
panied by rapid bank credit expansions. Accordingly, the emphasis should be 
on shifting the composition of  inflows from the short term to long term by 
possibly adding sand to the gears in order to slow short-term flows. 
Mullins suggested that contagion will continue to play a large role as long 
as markets are incomplete and individual portfolios are undiversified. Regard- 
ing the parallel between capital controls and circuit breakers, Mullins sug- 
gested that one of the lessons from his experience on the Brady Commission 
is that it is very difficult to stop temporary measures from becoming perma- 
nent. As a result, circuit breakers in the U.S. markets, which were intended to 
last two years, appear now to be permanent fixtures as are “temporary” capital 
controls in some countries. Regarding the Thai crisis, Mullins noted that, as in 
many stock bubbles, trying to short the underlying assets can prove extremely 
painful. Accordingly, completing markets and broadening the investor base 
provides the best remedy for overshooting. 